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Abstract 
          The 2013 Noble Peace Prize was awarded to the Organization for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons, the same year that events in the Syrian Civil War made clear the 
difficulties of implementing global disarmament and the imperative for doing so. In 
relation to this situation, my thesis asks if arms control and disarmament reduce conflict 
and tensions between states. Attempts at chemical weapons disarmament have been 
relatively successful but global disarmament faces major obstacles that will be difficult to 
overcome. To be sure, arms control and disarmament can be beneficial to peace: they are 
not a cause of war, can lessen the devastation of war, and even the potential for war to 
occur. If certain weapons are removed from the world, or even tightly controlled, then 
lives will be saved. But the benefits are limited, and even successful arms control is only 
minimally effective on its own. Removing chemical weapons eliminates one potential 
point of contention. However, nuclear arms control coupled with deterrence seems to be 
partially successful in preventing conflict. This combination minimizes warfare between 
nuclear powers, decreases tensions, and lessens lower-level conflict. In the end, arms 
control can only prevent war in conjunction alongside political and other military factors 
and, still, is far from a guarantor of peace. 
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 “The World is over-armed and peace is under-funded.”-Ban-Ki Moon 
“It is my fervent goal and hope…that we will some day no longer have to rely on 
nuclear weapons to deter aggression and assure world peace. To that end the United States 
is now engaged in a serious and sustained effort to negotiate major reductions in levels of 
offensive nuclear weapons with the ultimate goal of eliminating these weapons from the 
face of the earth.” 
Ronald Reagan, October 20, 1986 
Bent double, like old beggars under sacks, 
Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed 
through sludge, Till on the haunting flares 
we turned our backs And towards our 
distant rest began to trudge. Men marched 
asleep. Many had lost their boots But limped 
on, blood-shod. All went lame; all blind; 
Drunk with fatigue; deaf even to the hoots 
Of tired, outstripped Five-Nines that 
dropped behind. 
Gas! Gas! Quick, boys!—An ecstasy of 
fumbling, Fitting the clumsy helmets just in 
time; But someone still was yelling out and 
stumbling And flound’ring like a man in fire 
or lime... Dim, through the misty panes and 
thick green light, As under a green sea, I 
saw him drowning. 
In all my dreams, before my helpless sight, 
He plunges at me, guttering, choking, 
drowning. If in some smothering dreams you 
too could pace Behind the wagon that we 
flung him in, And watch the white eyes 
writhing in his face, 
His hanging face, like a devil’s sick of sin; If 
you could hear, at every jolt, the bloodCome 
gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs, 
Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud Of vile, 
incurable sores on innocent tongues,—My 
friend, you would not tell with such high zest 
To children ardent for some desperate glory, 
The old Lie: Dulce et decorum est Pro 
patria mori. 
-Wilfred Owen 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The Problem 
 The world is awash in armaments. It is estimated that there are at least 875 million 
guns in the world, almost certainly more. And there are close to 15,000 nuclear weapons 
around the world, a significant decrease from a height of over 60,000 during the Cold 
War, but still enough to destroy the world. There has been war somewhere throughout the 
world during the entire post-World War II era. Thus, war is a major concern and the 
armaments through which it is waged become a fundamental part of this problem. 
Therefore, arms control and disarmament become a means through which to potentially 
limit the chance of war occurring, or at least to mitigate the effects of war. In this thesis, I 
will address the following question: have arms control and disarmament reduced 
aggression and tensions between states? I hope to answer this question and examine what 
makes multilateral arms control and disarmament effective, particularly what role the 
geographical location of an agreement, the sort of weapons being restricted (or 
eliminated), how they are restricted, and what role the support or lack thereof of state and 
non-state actors plays in a restriction’s effectiveness. I plan to closely analyze two case 
studies: the chemical weapons convention, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties 
(START). At the end, I plan to conclude whether arms control and disarmament are 
effective at prolonging the reign of peace. 
Why it Matters? 
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  The study of arms control and disarmament is fascinating on both existential and 
intellectual levels. War is of vital global concern and limiting war is of utmost 
importance and a worthwhile goal to strive for. War in particular has always been an 
interest of mine, as have the means of limiting its horror. Arms control is one method for 
the minimization of war. Moreover weapons technology has also been one of my 
interests, as it contributes towards considerable suffering throughout the world. Arms 
control and disarmament, much like war, have a direct impact on humanity as whole and 
a direct impact on individuals.  
As a citizen of the United States hailing from a community and State (New 
Mexico) that relies to a substantial degree on military spending and the arms industry, 
including the industry relating to nuclear weapons, I am aware of the important, often 
beneficial, role that the military-industrial complex plays in the economy and many 
people’s lives even while it is devastating for many others.  
Arms control and disarmament also involve cooperation between various state-
actors as well as the involvement of non-state actors. An examination of this phenomenon 
is an eye-opening lenses from which to scrutinize International Studies. Arms control 
seeks to reduce interstate tensions and change the political landscape of state interaction 
whilst relying heavily on internal and international state politics.  Here, then, one enters 
into international relations and diplomacy. All of the above delineate that an examination 
of arms control and disarmament grants an opportunity to explore durable issues, 
including war and peace, which are of great personal interest.  
Methodology 
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 The methodology of this thesis will consist of archival research and case studies. I 
will explore some treaties and export control regimes, the effectiveness of enforcement, 
and relevant theory and politics.  I will examine specific case studies in order to see if 
these support my initial intuition. Though I want to be aware of a wide array of cases of 
attempts at arms control and disarmament, I will be focusing on the START treaties and 
the Chemical Weapons Convention. In reviewing these cases, I will identity the reasons 
behind why they function as they do and what plausibly explains their successes and 
failures. Much of this will be a comparison, identifying commonalities and differences 
between situations and what underlies them. I intend to examine arms control and 
disarmament at the state and global levels (rather than purely domestic arms control) and 
thus the relations between nation-states, particularly those with considerable hard power. 
Another point of inspection will be how the state power and inter-state relations 
determine the structure and success of arms control and disarmament agreements. I 
intend to evaluate actual treaties and other legal documentation regarding both arms 
control and disarmament.   
Key Concepts  
 Arms control and disarmament, war, peace, the state, and proliferation are the 
key concepts that surround this thesis. Arms control is the attempt to place restrictions on 
storage, proliferation, and use of weapons and thus to diminish their role in international 
affairs and, therefore, to give states an opportunity and mechanisms to collaborate. 
Disarmament is the complete elimination of a certain type of weapon. War is a state of 
armed conflict. Peace is the freedom from war or violence. Peace and war are 
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inextricably linked with both being the absence of one another. It is this dichotomous 
relationship between war and peace and the question of how to promote peace and limit 
war that gives rise to arms control. With war being a state of armed conflict between 
actors and with state being the dominant actor, interstate cooperation matters a great deal 
as well. The state is an important concept given that arms control and disarmament 
agreements are between states and the existence of the state governs the very existence, 
and the effectiveness of these agreements. Proliferation is to a very much one matter that 
arms control and disarmament seek to limit and thus preventing proliferation- i.e. an 
increase in numbers and spreading in location of armaments- becomes a vital aim of arms 
control. How well this is achieved and what the effects of limiting proliferation are on 
global and regional peace are questions to be scrutinized. 
Organization  
 This thesis will be divided into five chapters. The next chapter, Chapter two, is an 
overview of major concepts where I will especially define and examine these concepts: 
the state; war; peace; proliferation; and arms control and disarmament. I will focus on 
these concepts through the lens of established scholars. These concepts consist of a 
necessary base from which to launch an examination of the arms control and 
disarmament’s relation to peace. 
The third chapter will be on the history of arms control. I want to expose the 
theories and ideals that lie behind arms control and disarmament and how they are 
intimately interconnected with war and peace. I will also lay out an overview of arms 
control’s general history, particularly in the post-World War II era.  Arms control’s and 
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disarmament’s proponents, the obstacles faced, and those that it still faces and the some 
of the earlier major treaties signed will also be reviewed. 
The fourth chapter will specifically look at arms control and disarmament through 
treaties and export control regimes and the details surrounding these agreements. In order 
to examine this topic two case studies will be closely examined: the Chemical Weapons 
Convention; a treaty acceded to by most of the world’s nations, and the START treaties 
between the USA and the USSR/ Russia. Individual states that once possessed chemical 
weapons will be analyzed to ascertain why they disarmed. The few states that continue to 
possess chemical weapons and refuse to accede to the CWC will also be scrutinized in 
depth to discover why they have gone against the grain. I will also briefly review India-
Pakistan nuclear relations. Via these case studies, I will analyze the effects of arms 
control and disarmament and seek to answer the question as to how effective they have 
truly been in limiting war and mitigating its consequences. This will consist of the bulk of 
the work. 
The fifth and final chapter will recount the findings that this thesis draws and 
provide an answer to the overarching question of whether arms control and disarmament 
limit interstate aggression. The thesis’s conclusion also predicts the future of arms control 
and disarmament and appraises how they can be improved in order to better limit the 
ravages of war and the means through which this might be brought into fruition.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review and Concepts 
There exists a plethora of material analyzing arms control and disarmament. 
Much of this material comes from various arms control and disarmament regimes, 
international or state bodies, and non-governmental organizations who are concerned 
with the matter. Not surprisingly most of the work is specific towards one variety of 
weapon and the related arms control or disarmament. One of these sorts of weapons two 
with substantial literature on them are chemical and nuclear weapons. The literature on 
the CWC, which is largely considered as a decent success even while much of the 
discussion on the attempted destruction of chemical weapons, and the prevention of their 
use, centers on the immense challenges faced. The literature on nuclear arms control is 
vast, particularly between the USA and Russia/Soviet Union. While New START is seen 
as a benefit for nuclear arms control it is almost universally accepted as a modest treaty; 
particularly compared to other potential options that might have been.  
In regards to war and peace, in which arms control and disarmament can perform 
a vital role, a substantial amount has been written. It is true that there are considerably 
more factors than just arms control or arms races that influence this dichotomy. But that 
is not to say that arms control and disarmament cannot be influential, and they can even 
be difference-makers in certain situations. Its effectiveness remains a contentious topic in 
the literature. Proliferation has oft been discussed with many thinkers maintaining that 
arms control and disarmament regimes can restrict proliferation considerably. When anti-
proliferation is backed up with enforcement by state parties it can be rather effective. As 
the arms control and disarmament treaties that I examine are between states and the wars 
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they seek to prevent or limit can be classified as either interstate or intrastate, an 
examination of the foundational unit of the state is necessary going forwards. It is clear 
that much of war, peace, arms control, disarmament, and proliferation hinges on the state.  
The State 
The state is the principle unit of geopolitical organization in the modern world 
and is defined by Gianfranco Poggi as “an organization” where political power is vested 
and exercised through a body of rules, a series of roles, and a body of resources.
1
 States 
are the primary bodies through which arms control and disarmament treaties function. 
After all, it is negotiations between states that form these treaties and states are the ones 
that sign and ratify these agreements. Of course, states are composed of individuals and 
are not one completely unified body.
2
 Thus who is in power within the government has 
an appreciable impact. Separating government and the regime in power from the more 
fundamental state and from citizens is beneficial to understand how the state relates to 
arms control. Some regimes are more, or less, likely to accede to arms control or 
disarmament agreements. It is important to note that the domestic aspects do affect 
international relations.
3
 But I am less interested with the domestic aspects of the state 
then how they interact amongst each other internationally, as arms control and 
disarmament are essentially one form of this interaction.  
Social Contract theory is important to the conception of the modern western state, 
including ideas of legitimacy. The social contract helps to explain how a state can speak 
                                                          
1
 Poggi, Gianfranco. The state: Its nature, development, and prospects. Stanford University Press, 1990, 19. 
2
 Koh, Harold Hongju. "Why do nations obey international law?." (1997): 2657. 
3
 Haggard, Stephan, and Beth A. Simmons. "Theories of international regimes." International 
organization 41.3 (1987): 499. 
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for its citizens when negotiating arms control and how internal opposition (such as 
factions of the United States Congress) can derail arms control treaties.
4
 A legitimate 
government has authority over its subjects as they have consented to be governed and 
come under the rule of the sovereign state in exchange for protection.
5
 The individual 
benefits from this arrangement as states seek to protect themselves and their citizens from 
other states. The rationale for the state’s existence as ensuring citizen’s safety, and 
functioning as better protective mechanism for individuals, can help to drive the arms 
race. At the same time the state helps act as a body to prevent arms races between 
individuals by instituting arms control internally.
6
 Of course, many people around the 
world do not consent to be governed and are kept in line through coercion and force.
 7
 
Fear of the government is one manner of control, but another is fear of the outside, 
particularly of other states.
8
 Thus international tensions, and especially war, can benefit a 
regime’s domestic legitimacy. 
Sovereignty is vital to the state and is what the modern nation-state largely 
derives from. The state has the right to full control and power over its own affairs, 
without interference from others. The common modern conception of the state is largely 
western, with a Westphalian conception of sovereignty. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 
is where the primacy of a state system was established. Each state was recognized to have 
                                                          
4
 “Social Contract Theory” IEP-University of Tennessee at Martin. https://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/ 
5
 Kymlicka, Will. "The social contract tradition." A companion to ethics (1993): 190. 
6
 Whitman, James Q. "Between Self-Defense and Vengence/between Social Contract and Monopoly of 
Violence." Tulsa L. Rev. 39 (2003): 911. 
7
 Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild. "Containing fear: the origins and management of ethnic 
conflict." International security 21.2 (1996): 45. 
8
 Bramstedt, Ernest Kohn. Dictatorship and political police: The technique of control by fear. Routledge, 
2013, 165. 
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exclusive sovereignty over its territory, and the principle of noninterference set forth by 
Westphalia continues to this day.
9
 Of course, this principle of noninterference has never 
been completely adhered to but the Westphalian system is still the dominant paradigm 
today. But there are challenges to this paradigm of the state in the increasingly 
globalizing world.
10
 One of these challenges is fracturing, threats of separatist 
movements and insurgencies.
11
 Another is the coalescing of states such that the sovereign 
state becomes absorbed into broader entities.
12
 The position of the state is safe for the 
near future at least however, and for quite a bit longer in my opinion, at least long enough 
to assume the state as the foundational unit from which to examine arms control and 
disarmament. Separatist movements seek to create their own states, with the same prime 
characteristics, and insurgencies often seek to topple a current regime and take control of 
a state, or establish a new state out of the territory of others. Attempts at expansion tend 
to absorb states into other states or into structures that can be deemed extremely state-like 
(such as a hypothetical united Europe). Either way, the idea of the state is not under as 
much threat as many believe even with cross-border movement intensifying and 
expanding. 
There are more renewed threats to sovereignty, particularly since the 1990s, that 
concern international law and intervention in what was once considered sovereign affairs. 
                                                          
9
 Hayman And, P. A., and John Williams. "Westphalian sovereignty: Rights, intervention, meaning and 
context." Global society 20.4 (2006): 521. 
10
 Osiander, Andreas. "Sovereignty, international relations, and the Westphalian myth." International 
organization 55.2 (2001): 252. 
11
 Pitty, Roderic, and Shannara Smith. "The indigenous challenge to Westphalian sovereignty." Australian 
Journal of Political Science 46.1 (2011): 123. 
12
 Sørensen, Georg. "Sovereignty: Change and continuity in a fundamental institution." Political 
Studies 47.3 (1999): 591. 
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The right of intervention if another state represented a large enough security threat has 
been around for a while. The argument behind this being: another state’s sovereignty is 
only to be violated if one’s own sovereignty is under threat, usually based on what is 
perceived as an act of aggression.
 13
 However the right to humanitarian intervention 
entails the violation of a state’s sovereignty when there is no perceived direct threat to the 
intervening powers. Instead, sovereignty is violated in order to achieve humanitarian 
objectives.
14
 Under this conception certain states, the great powers, possess a 
responsibility to protect in order to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity.
15
 Included within war crimes and crimes against humanity are 
prohibitions on the use of certain weapons, consequently circling back to arms control or 
disarmament. Military intervention can function as a perverse sort of arms control or 
disarmament. A state can be disarmed via force, either in response to aggression or the 
threat of aggression, or to prevent the humanitarian and human rights disasters. 
It is only through the support of modern states that international and supranational 
organizations and regimes, such as the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, can function. Nonetheless states often benefit from membership in 
supranational organizations and unions. Membership of international organizations, such 
as the UN, also confers legitimacy on a state, with membership concurrent on the 
recognition of sovereignty by other states. There is also legitimacy to be gained by 
following international laws and norms. This is self-enforcing in that the majority of 
states are unlikely to tolerate violations and also less predisposed to relations with “rogue 
                                                          
13
 Krasner, S. D. (1999) Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 21 
14
 Ibid, 102. 
15
 Ibid, 257. 
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states.” Within most supranational organizations, and treaty regimes, the belief reigns that 
each  member state is equal and to be treated as such, at least within that organization.
16
 
Of course looking at the funding for these organizations, or even who has voting rights 
(such as the permanent members of the UN Security Council), makes it clear this is only 
an ideal. Nonetheless, the state does gain legitimacy by joining, rather than going against, 
international norms and groups.  
The nation state emerges as state-building and nation-building often overlap and a 
created sense of nationhood and a bond between strangers builds up the modern state. 
Ethno-nationalism is not necessary for the creation of a nation-state as there is the 
potential for civic nationalism, as well as national minorities that are seen as being part of 
the nation. Multinational and multiethnic states are common, including the USA and 
Russia, but both have heavy strains of nationalism and patriotism. What is common 
amongst all these states is that they gain legitimacy and power through unity in this bond 
of strangers.
17
 
State vitality is important to keep in mind as this is directly related to state 
legitimacy and also to the ability for a state to accede to and enforce an arms control or 
disarmament agreement. The more vitality a state possesses, referring to the ability of the 
state to sustain a beneficial position, the easier it is for a state to accede to an arms control 
treaty and also to influence other states, particularly those with less vitality, to accede as 
well. As outlined by JDB Miller sovereignty plays a role as a source of vitality for the 
                                                          
1616
 Franck, Thomas M. "Legitimacy in the international system." American Journal of International 
Law 82.4 (1988): 705-759. 
17
 Yack, Bernard. "Popular sovereignty and nationalism." Political theory 29.4 (2001): 534. 
18 
 
state.
18
 The more active sovereignty a state has in practice over its territory the greater its 
ability to enforce matters and the greater its legitimacy. A strong state is necessary for 
arms control or disarmament.  
Throughout their existence states have always interacted with each other and 
diplomatic relations between states are major parts of the international landscape. This is 
after all what arms control and disarmament agreements are based off. It is because of 
this that I approach arms control and disarmament and their effects on conflict through a 
state-level analysis. Realist international relations theory holds the state to be the primary 
actor internationally. This is much the same with liberal theory. Both schools of thought 
also accept an anarchical world system.
19
 That independent sovereign states have no 
central authority above them can be taken as a given. Thus states must make agreements 
with each other in order to bring about arms control or disarmament. The realist struggle 
for power, heavily focused on the military aspects can explain security dilemma and 
security existing as a zero-sum game. Attempts at hegemony or preserving the balance of 
power are important state motivations that lead necessarily to increased tension and a 
spirit of insecurity as vigilance and constant preparation for conflict are part of a state’s 
existence. Under this conception wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.
20
 
The Soviet/ Russia and United States relations follow the realist conceptions more closely 
in my understanding. Liberalist views are a bit more optimistic in that the 
                                                          
18
 Miller, John Donald Bruce. "Sovereignty as a source of vitality for the state." Review of international 
studies 12.2 (1986): 82. 
19
 Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal 
institutionalism." International organization 42.3 (1988): 490. 
20
 Waltz, Kenneth (1954). Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis. New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press.; Poggi. The State. 111. 
19 
 
interdependence of states works to prevent war and common institutions, such as 
democratic ones, can prevent conflict and tension. Under liberalism there is hope for 
global disarmament with a more interdependent world and common ideas between states. 
There are other schools of thought that dispute even the anarchical world system and 
explaining how states interact with each other is a complex task. Why arms control is 
needed, how state go about pursuing it, and how this impacts the relations between states 
is relatively easier task. 
One aspect of the state is the monopolization of violence. As  Max Weber asserts 
the state “lays claim to the monopoly on the legitimated use of physical force.”21 Any 
right to use force, even by the individual in self-defense comes from the state. This 
exclusive right to force emerges from the legitimization of the state.
22
 This 
monopolization of force coupled with the greater ability of the state to develop, produce, 
stockpile, and use armaments has led to a greater imperative for arms control but also 
means that the arms control can be achieved through negotiations between states, and 
states alone. Weaker states are also less secure states and more vulnerable to disruptive 
conflict. Weak, often post-colonial, states lack vitality and their illegitimate governance 
structure breeds resistance which is strengthened when the ineffectual governments seek 
to strengthen the state, leading to internal conflict, which can spread externally.
23
   
War 
                                                          
21
 Weber, Max. "Politics as a Vocation." 1919, 1. 
22
 Ibid, 3 
23
 Holsti, Kalevi Jaakko. The state, war, and the state of war. No. 51. Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
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War is an acute act of violence, a state of armed conflict, a period of hostility 
between organized parties. It has been with civilization throughout. War may not require 
the state, but the state always has to deal with war even if rather indirectly only in 
preparation.
24
 War is central to the state’s very nature and political changes are 
influenced very much so by military ones and vice versa.
25
 Clausewitz in his book On 
War says that "War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a 
continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means." Indeed 
much of the organization of the state centers on war. For Kant “every nation must be so 
organized internally that not the head of the nation-for whom, properly speaking, war has 
no cost… but rather the people who pay for it have the decisive voice as to whether or not 
there should be war.”26 The decision to go to war is not one to be taken lightly, and wars 
consume a great deal of a state’s resources, potentially having a deep impact on the 
Homefront and the very idea of a nation.  
The development of war in theory, and particularly in practice, makes arms 
control more of necessity as the armaments, and tactics that accompany them, become 
more and more destructive. The ideas of total war that emerged in the modern era with 
the French revolutionary wars and the Napoleonic Wars with the nation at arms and the 
pouring of an entire nation into the war effort. The increased destructiveness of war and 
the blurring of lines between combatants and non-combatants meant that war was more 
impactful than ever and this fact underscores arms control’s necessity. Total war is 
                                                          
24
 Katzenstein, P., ed. (1996) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 14. 
25
 Poggi,The development of the modern state: A sociological introduction. 111. 
26
 Kant, Immanuel. Perpetual peace and other essays. Hackett Publishing, 1983. 
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unrestricted in the sorts of weapons used, although this does not necessarily mean that all 
weapons will be flung into the fray. Nonetheless the existence of weapons of mass 
destruction means that war now has the possibility to lead to a catastrophic apocalyptic 
scenario with the destruction of whole nations and even the possibility of the extinction 
of humanity through our own hands.  
The insights of Clausewitz are highly useful in understanding the nature or 
warfare. Clausewitz’s relevance beyond the 19th century is shown by an “endless 
adaption of Clausewitz to new situations” including nuclear warfare and the War of 
Terror.
27
 War being the continuation of politik, a blend of politics and policy, is one of 
Clausewitz’s more famous ideas. War is always fought for a political objective, as a 
means of reaching said objective and more an instrument to do so than a simple 
continuation of policy.
28
 This subordination of military point of view to the political is 
not only present but desirable. Acts of terrorism are as much driven by policy, and the 
motives indeed do not need to be wholly political, as state-directed invasions.
29
 
Clausewitz’s abstraction of absolute war and limited war are not present in the real world 
(nor are they presented as such) but they function well as two ends of a scale with which 
war varies. Knowing what war one is fighting is extremely important today if one wishes 
to achieve victory. Absolute war, once purely abstraction, has become a greater 
possibility with the threat of nuclear exchanges. Indeed the adaptation of Clausewitz’s 
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point for nuclear strategy partially reveals not only the adaptability of Clausewitz but also 
the timeless nature of many of his thoughts on war.  
Clausewitz’s idea of friction differentiates real war from war in theory. This 
friction encapsulates that war relies heavily on chance and is composed of many moving 
parts. Thus the probability for something to deviate from theory is high.
30
 Friction is what 
makes war unpredictable. A great leader can cope with friction through instinct coupled 
with experience and good grounding in theory. Still Clausewitz compares it to steering a 
ship (a Napoleonic-era vessel probably) past reefs in uncharted seas in the dark a task that 
it at best extraordinarily difficult and that even the best instinct is unsure of completing 
safely.
31
 This is true of war today, as it was back in Clausewitz’s day, and it is true for the 
foreseeable future. Even if it easier to navigate conflict due to technological advances 
friction is still present and is one of the Clausewitz’s key insights regarding war. The 
uncertainty of war means that even if certain weapons are not utilized at first there is no 
guarantee that this will continue. Thus arms control seeks to preemptively prevent the use 
of weapons via peacetime restrictions.  
Clausewitz’s trinity is extremely relevant and strikes at the nature of war. The 
wondrous trinity of violence, purpose, and effort are useful to understand the nature of 
war and to wage war whether in the past, present, and future. Balancing this trinity is 
important in theory and in practice. Clausewitz recognizes that war is fraught with danger 
and peril (an insight that anyone would see) and that violence and danger and their effects 
on those experiencing war are vital parts of friction and understanding this and the 
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emotions in war, including an enthusiasm for killing, is vital to navigate warfare.
32
 
According to Echevarria, this part of the trinity, hostility, is particularly present in the 
War on Terror with it particularly factoring into a war of wills with US policy indeed 
being partially an attempt to undermine the hostility and willingness to fight driving 
many of terrorist organizations.
33
 Policy functions as a guiding force for war that governs 
the efforts of the military and restrains the passions of violence.
34
 
Clausewitz’s ideas on what he deems the “center of gravity” (Schwerpunkt) are 
just as important now. Armies, capital, and people are, as they were back in the 1800s, 
potential “centers of gravity” that a state’s energies ought to be directed at during open 
hostilities.
35
 During the USA invasion of Iraq, Baghdad and the Iraqi army functioned as 
centers of gravity and the USA concentrated its forces on these targets defeating the Iraqi 
army and capturing Baghdad with relative ease, thus concluding the USA invasion as a 
success. Of course the Iraq War quickly shifted as an insurgency emerged and the “center 
of gravity” became the Iraqi people. There are always nucleuses of extreme importance in 
war, though what they are changes. The populace is often a “center of gravity” with 
people, including non-combatants functioning as targets. This does not mean that the 
populace is necessarily targeted to be killed. Rather one may attempt to bring a particular 
constituencies over to one’s side; the winning of hearts and minds. This can be done via 
the creation of social and political ties as Hezbollah has managed to do, and as the US 
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and Afghan National Government are attempting to do in Afghanistan.
36
 Other, more 
destructive, methods to address a the populace being the “center of gravity” include: the 
Allied attempt to destroy the enemy’s will and industrial capacity via de-housing the 
German workers during World War II, and counter-value nuclear strikes where entire 
cities are targets.  
In order to wage war armaments are necessary. There have been major 
technological advances in warfare and modern militaries are capable of more destruction 
than ever before. The modern state has the prerequisite of a large and powerful military 
force.
37
 For great powers this can include WMDs. Whether there are WMD’s or not large 
military arsenals threaten the potential for war, and increasingly devastating war, which is 
what arms control seeks to prevent.  
The existence of “total war” means of course that war can be limited and its worst 
excesses can be contained. Thus arms control seeks to prevent conflict but also to limit it 
and mitigate the consequences if it does occur. The strategy and tactics used are a key 
part in the possibility of devastation in a war. The other key part is the weapons used. 
Both have been the subject of attempts to limit their worst excesses through rules of war 
and conventions (such as the famous Geneva conventions). Arms control particularly 
tackles this through limiting the weapons used or threatened to be used. 
Peace 
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War and peace are two terms in opposition. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines war as “a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups 
within a country” whilst a definition of peace (from the Oxford English Dictionary) is “a 
state or period in which there is no war or a war has ended.” Since peace is the absence of 
war it is worth examining it in depth and what role arms control has to play in this. But 
there are also certain peculiarities specific to peace that is more than just the absence of 
conflict as peace can be tension-filled and could lead to large-scale hostilities.  
A distinction can and ought to be made between negative and positive peace. 
These ideas emerged earlier, but were famously articulated by Galtung. Negative peace is 
the absence of violence, the inverse of war, where there is no active conflict. This has 
been the standard definition of peace for most of history but this peace allows for tension 
and arms races, as well as human rights abuses. Positive peace on the other hand goes 
beyond the mere absence of war and includes peace with justice, cooperation, and lack of 
tensions though unlike negative peace what defines positive peace is not consistently 
agreed upon. Galtung defined positive peace as “the integration of human society” that 
combats the deeper long-term structural aspects that cause conflict.
38
 The need for arms 
control largely arises from the uneasy, tension filled, negative peace, and seeks to reduce 
the level of tension, tackling negative peace without trying to eliminate it (a futile task for 
just arms control anyhow). However there are broader hopes for positive peace with 
disarmament, which seeks to divest states of certain armaments and, as a result, relieve 
potential points of tension and obstacles to peace. 
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Kant’s idea of perpetual peace, permanent peace over the globe, is based on a 
foundation of similar republican states and “federation of free states all around the 
world.”39 This furnishes Kant’s ideas that ideally it is the citizens of the state who should 
decide whether that state will go to war. For the citizens of the state naturally will 
consider all calamities and costs they may have to bear before committing themselves to 
hostilities. There is also the theory that citizens, as in opposition to regimes, do not want 
to fight each other and governments responsible to their citizens will be less likely to go 
to war. Republican and Democratic governments are often thought to be more inclined to 
peace. The democratic peace theory holds that democracies do not go to war with each 
other due to common domestic institutions constraining the recourse to war. This may 
well link correlation with causation and the democratic nature of states may not explain 
present peace between democracies, with other factors such as American dominance over 
democratic states, potentially playing a role.
40
 
Deterrence can create conditions for peace, though a negative peace that is tension 
filled. Under deterrence, states with a deterrent do not go to war with each other due to 
the destruction that would occur. Deterrence, therefore, prevents war even if political 
factors are conducive to it. The deterrent is by nature potential military force, and as such 
includes armaments as well as the willingness to use them in retaliation. This deterrent 
can be conventional arms; the American conventional bomber fleet can flatten countries, 
but is more typically applied to nuclear weapons, though it also functions well for other 
weapons of mass destruction. There are two parts to successful deterrence: the military 
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capability, which arms control can address directly; and the bargaining behavior 
(including brinkmanship) that enhances credibility that the state is willing to use its 
military might.
41
 A strategy of deterrence does increase tension and, if not addressed, will 
lead to an arms race. Deterrence does also not necessarily benefit global peace.   
The stability-instability paradox exists when direct large-scale warfare is avoided 
amongst adversaries due to deterrence, thus producing stability in this arena. However the 
adversarial states still jockey for advantage and involve themselves in surrogates for 
direct conflict as a result of the tensions that cannot be released in direct hostilities, 
leading to instability elsewhere.
42
 This paradox specifically relates to nuclear weapons 
and demonstrates the flaws of negative peace. Direct large scale war is avoided but blood 
and treasure are still expended as there is an escalation in conflict in the periphery. 
Nuclear deterrence induces caution and prevents war such as during the Cold War 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, but drives completion into safer pursuits 
and increase limited war.
43
 Therefore deterrence actually increases violence at lower 
levels. This is because smaller ventures, such as proxy wars or border skirmishes, can be 
undertaken with impunity as the risk that these lower level conflicts spiral into a large 
scale war is severely decreased (due to the effectiveness of deterrence). In the case of 
India and Pakistan, small level skirmishes in Kashmir and support for indigenous 
insurgencies is aided by nuclear deterrence. These small conflicts are seen as controllable 
and calculable and the likelihood of them spinning into full-scale nuclear war is relatively 
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miniscule given the devastating consequences of such a conflict.
44
 In fact, the stability-
instability paradox is most commonly used to refer to the Cold War and the many proxy 
wars that took place then, and the tension-filled relations between India Pakistan. 
Particularly this is proposed to hurt tensions as Pakistan is weaker than India 
conventionally, but it’s nuclear capabilities make the results of a war more uncertain and 
deadly and allow Pakistan to act more aggressively, thus hurting the chances for peace 
and while preventing full-scale war, breeding more low-level conflict that is nonetheless 
devastating to many people.
45
 Even in 1954, B.H. Liddell Hart stated that “To the extent 
that the H-bomb reduces the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibility of 
limited war pursued by widespread local aggression.”46 The realization of mutual assured 
destruction, provided by submarine launched missiles, Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles 
and Hydrogen Bombs, led many to a similar conclusion. Glenn Snyder in the 1960s (in 
his 1961 book Deterrence and Defense, and an chapter of the 1965 book Balance of 
Power, where he espoused this stability-instability paradox but added that the opposite 
could be argued as well. 
Proliferation 
Proliferation is the spread of weapons and the increase in the number of states that 
possess them. Proliferation could occur for all types of weapons and in many cases is part 
of international trade, with many nations purchasing weapons from the great powers. In 
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other cases, states could develop their own weapons and for WMDS this has been the 
modus operandi of proliferation. Counter-proliferation consists of attempts to thwart 
proliferation by preventing the acquisition of weapons via intelligence, law-enforcement, 
and military efforts. Such efforts include impeding the export of certain materials 
necessary to build nuclear weapons is. Non-proliferation efforts include diplomatic 
treaties to prevent the spread of weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons is one good example. Prevention of proliferation is oftentimes diplomatic, with 
economic sanctions being a tool to dissuade states, but military action can and has been 
taken. The Israeli airstrikes on Syrian and Iraqi nuclear facilities are cases of non-
diplomatic measure to prevent proliferation.  
Proliferation occurs for varying reasons, but security is usually the primary 
concern when a state that has the capability chooses to adopt, or to not adopt, a weapons 
technology, though legitimacy is also important, particularly with WMDS. 
Scott Sagan aids the examination of proliferation of nuclear weapons by 
examining why states choose to build nuclear weapons.
47
 He challenges the then 
conventional wisdom that nuclear proliferation only occurs when a state faces a 
significant military threat that cannot be met otherwise. Thus they require a powerful 
deterrent to maintain their security. The realist security model means that the 
development of a nuclear arsenal creates a threat and power imbalance that rival states 
seek to correct by developing their own nuclear weapons. The Domestic Model focuses 
on the internal actors and the political and bureaucratic interest of certain actors. As 
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relates to arms control, an international regime can pressure domestic interests but 
domestic interests have an extensive amount of control. The Norms Model emphasizes 
nuclear symbolism where a nuclear arsenal adds legitimacy to the state. Indeed 
legitimacy may be a key issue for any weaponry which a state possesses and which might 
come under potential arms control.  
Given that states are the ones who decide to develop and produce these weapons 
in the first place, it is useful to examine why states adapt weapons of mass destruction. 
Some of the reasoning that Sagan puts forth can also be applied to other weapons, 
particularly weapons of mass destruction, though to a lesser extent for weapons like 
landmines, and cluster munitions. Security concerns are an obvious motivation for WMD 
development. Seeking to remove military disadvantages that often translate into 
geopolitical ones is what drives the security dilemma. The pursuit of nuclear weapons by 
all the current nuclear powers was at least partially driven by anxieties surrounding 
security and supposed vulnerabilities. Production of nuclear weapons was largely in 
response to adversaries; where a state sought to develop nuclear weapons to counter 
against a rival state: the USSR to counter the USA, the UK and France to counter the 
USSR (intensified by uncertainty over just how far the USA would go to protect Europe), 
India to counter China, and Pakistan to counter India. This was also the case with 
European development of chemical weapons prior to, and during, the First World War. 
However, there is a danger in trying to find the security threat that caused a state to 
pursue weapons and alternative reasons must also be examined. Legitimacy obtained by 
possession of nuclear weapons in particular, is something that many states seek. Nuclear 
31 
 
weapons do help to ensure a state’s and regime’s survival,  but by ascending to a nuclear 
club a state can also hope to gain other benefits and respect that great powers possess. 
Legitimacy may also be sought domestically, as nuclear weapons can be showcased 
internally as symbol of a state’s weighty status in the international community and 
military prowess and, thus appealing to nationalist and militaristic sentiment. 
Bureaucratic and industrial actors may also be part of the cause as Sagan examines.
48
 
Morton Halperin advocates this viewpoint, where bureaucratic actors encourage an 
extreme perception of threats and lobby for increased defense spending and development, 
oftentimes benefitting themselves and creating the conditions for nuclear development, 
along with a whole host of other developments, including chemical and biological 
weapons.
49
 In India, for example, there was substantial internal debate whether India 
should develop nuclear weapons or pledge itself to nuclear disarmament. Here domestic 
politics definitely played a role as the ruling Indian National Congress was increasingly 
unpopular and nuclear testing was thought to be potentially beneficial to the ruling party 
popularity. This turned out to be true. Ninety percent of Indians surveyed in a June 1974 
poll were proud of the achievement of obtaining nuclear weapons and India’s standing in 
the world was increased amongst the international community as well. This heightened 
standing in the international community, or at least the perceived increase seen by the 
Indian government and populace, was largely due to norms where nuclear weapons were 
possessed only by the most powerful and modern states. The nuclear club is exclusive, 
partly due to the costs involved in developing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal, but also 
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owing to the nuclear proliferation regime that seeks to limit nuclear weapons. In another 
example, France developed nuclear weapons not only to counter the Soviet Union, but 
more so to gain the symbolic political significance that comes along with nuclear weapon 
possession, at a time when France was trying to reassert its status as a great power that it 
had enjoyed before World War II. 
Arms Control and Disarmament 
In simple terms arms control is the limitation of arms through methods such as the 
reduction of the number of weapons, the types of weapons or delivery systems, the 
research and manufacture of certain weapons, or the levels or locales of deployments of 
these weapons
50
. Arms control can be unilateral but it is usually an agreement between 
multiple parties. All the treaties regarding nuclear arsenals are strictly arms control, 
seeking only limitations in stockpile numbers or technologies. Harald Muller postulates 
that for arms control regimes to be successful three conditions must be fulfilled: Treaty 
community coherence, leadership, and great power cooperation.
51
 Arms control can be 
divided into several types as laid out by Roach, Griffiths, and O’Callaghan.52 There are 
horizontal restrictions which deal with non-proliferation and preventing the spread of 
weapons. These include geographic restrictions that limit the placement of certain 
weapons, numerical restrictions, which involve caps on the quantity of certain weapons, 
technological restrictions, covering the limiting or banning of certain technologies, 
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particularly those that threaten the balance of power, and confidence building measures, 
which include sharing knowledge and establishing communication measures and, 
importantly compliance and verification. Oftentimes, arms control agreements are 
combinations of these with verification being important to successful agreements. 
Disarmament refers to the complete elimination of certain armaments. This is 
what the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons (Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty) seeks to do. Disarmament can be unilateral or 
multilateral (or bilateral). For the CWC it is multilateral but the USA unilaterally decided 
to proceed with disarmament of its chemical weapons stockpile under George H. Bush 
(although it is not expected to complete this until 2023). Nuclear disarmament appears at 
this present time as a distant horizon to reach and though proliferation may be prevented 
and stockpiles reduced, the nuclear threat is surely something that humankind will be 
living with for quite some time.   
The CWC aims for eventual disarmament. Some also seek similar disarmament of 
nuclear weapons as well as of other weapons of mass destructions and other armaments 
that cause inordinate damage to civilians such as landmines and cluster munitions. Of 
course actually achieving disarmament faces obstacles. The process of disarmament can 
include reductions in weaponry not just complete destruction, but complete reductions 
must be the goal. Disarmament can be considered an extension of arms control though 
the terms are not synonymous even if they are related. Sometimes the terms are used 
somewhat interchangeably colloquially. But there is a clear scholarly distinction and in 
this thesis I differentiate between the two though by no means are the definitions I 
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present necessarily universal and they are very much centered on weapons of mass 
destruction. 
Arms control and disarmament are obviously very closely related to war and 
peace. It is commonly supposed that both are beneficial and help to prevent war and 
mitigate its effects. But in order to inhibit war arms control must be successful. Exactly 
what this success entails is open to interpretation and specific to the surrounding 
circumstances. However one clear conception entails when an arms control agreement is 
being adhered to by the acceded parties.  More widely, it may depend on how many 
nation-states are acceding to the agreement, which is going to be quite different for 
landmines compared to nuclear weapons (with nuclear weapons agreements just between 
the USA and Russia are necessary for serious reductions in numbers). The same criteria 
can be used for disarmament with a particular emphasis on the global dimension. Arms 
control seeks to deter challenges to peace by establishing a world order that does so 
through limiting certain armaments, or in the case of disarmament, eliminating them 
completely. It is important to note that neither arms control nor disarmament can present 
any claim to prevent war completely; rather they seek to prevent and limit war under 
certain circumstances, by controlling armaments. But war will be fought anyway, the 
causes being primarily political, and arms control and disarmament seek to prevent 
certain wars from breaking out and certain weapons, usually those with major 
indiscriminate destructive power, from being utilized. 
Though arms control can be implemented through force, diplomacy is the most 
common method through which it is achieved. Either way, the state is heavily involved 
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and indeed political power is especially important when it comes to weapons of mass 
destruction, and doubly so with nuclear weapons as they change calculations of warfare 
by providing for mutual assured destruction. 
The security dilemma is the problem that arms control is supposed to aid in 
solving. This dilemma is a situation where a state increases its military power, such as 
through developing and stockpiling certain weapons, with the intention of increasing its 
security, based on the simple premise that militarily and politically stronger states are 
more secure. This leads other states to respond in turn, by stockpiling more of a certain 
weapons for instance, and increasing tensions as this pattern continues. The dilemma 
arises as the tensions and risk of conflict threaten the states security even while the state 
seeks to increase its security be increasing military power to gain at least a minimum 
level of deterrence. With the advent of new weapons, particularly weapons of mass 
destruction, the dilemma becomes increasingly worrisome due to attempts to achieve an 
advantage over opponents, often before rules of use and competition are put in place and 
clarified, driving arms races into overdrive. This may be seen partially in the early years 
of the Cold War with major tensions and risk of war over Berlin and Cuba, and the arms 
race driven by fear of disadvantage such as the “bomber gap.” The Cold War experience 
also showcases the potential for mutual assured destruction to prevent the security 
dilemma from spiraling into war. However, there are several problems that arise, 
particularly the stability-instability paradox and the increased violence in the periphery. 
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The security dilemma is largely seen as going along with realist international theory and 
makes sense in an anarchic system.
53
  
A common criticism is that arms control does not work and does not successfully 
deal with the security dilemma. Perhaps if arms control was universal, rigorous, and 
adhered to by all the states of the world, it might. However, imperfect arms control does 
little to nothing to benefit the world. This criticism is not so with the theory and ideals 
behind arms control so much as with its implementation, which is flawed and according 
to some cannot help but be so. There, then, arises the question of whether this 
implementation can be fixed and if so how to go about doing so. A major issue with 
implementation is verification. For, arms control functions as only a cloak with no real 
depth behind it, with countries, particularly the major powers, holding banned weapons in 
secret and attempting to gain an unfair advantage.   
For some scholars, such as Richard Betts, arms control is detrimental and in fact 
undermines military stability.
54
 He argues that equalizing military power through arms 
control may yield “unequal forces when alignments congeal.” The issue with arms 
control is not that it doesn’t work but that it is detrimental when it does work. Arms 
control, and particularly disarmament, diminishes deterrence. Disarmament eliminates 
certain arms and thus eliminates the deterrent consisting of that weapon. This is not much 
of a problem with chemical weapons, but with nuclear weapons it may be a real concern 
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given the potential importance of the nuclear deterrent in preventing World War III. Even 
with just arms control an equal balance and state of deterrence may be threatened, leading 
to increased chances of war as certain powers and alignments gain a clear advantage 
encouraging aggression, or even as deterrence weakens to become not enough of a 
deterrent to prevent conflict. 
Arms control offers an avenue to perpetual peace and disarmament does so to an 
even greater extent. Walter Clemens argues that this is only part of the drive to peace as 
even if “total disarmament could be achieved men would still be likely to fight one 
another.”55 This is also a losing battle in many ways, with arms control seemingly feeling 
further and further behind. However Clemens does believe that without arms control the 
world would be in far worse state and is in fact necessary for peace, though not sufficient. 
At its best it only succeeds in “outfoxing the adversary for the time being” but is 
important in the idealist project to bring about perpetual peace. 
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Chapter Three: History and Theory of Arms Control 
A Brief History 
The history of arms control goes back a considerable length of time. Organized 
arms control regimes that we might recognize appear to arise during the medieval era. 
The Roman Catholic Church spearheaded some of these early attempts as a supranational 
entity. This sort of arms control applied to multiple “proto-states” and also to all 
individuals under the authority of the Catholic Church. The Second Lateran Council of 
1139 attempted to ban the use of crossbows amongst Christians. It was a clear failure. 
Later on there were attempts to ban expanding bullets and there was a clear distinction 
between what weapons could be used against civilized powers, where arms control 
agreements were made, and against the “uncivilized,” which had virtually no restrictions. 
Some scholars believe that remnants of the earlier attitudes remain and there are certainly 
differing standards in practice between NATO countries and those in central Africa for 
instance. Modern arms control relies heavily on the state which did not emerge until quite 
a bit later. Arms control also became a matter of greater concern with the increased 
effectiveness of weaponry and the corresponding increase in the devastation of war. 
 The Hague Declaration to World War II.  
The Hague Declaration of 1899 prohibited the use of projectiles whose sole 
purpose is to spread poisonous gases. This was confirmed in The Hague Convention of 
1907, which banned the use of poison in warfare, only to be heavily violated during 
World War I. The  1899 declaration and the 1907 convention has had no real effect in 
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limiting chemical warfare through the inter-war years and into World War II and 
beyond.
56
 The Geneva Protocol of 1925 again outlawed poison gas and made the 
prohibition more specific and extensive. It is interesting to note that there were also 
prohibitions in these agreements against dropping bombs from balloons which were 
completely ignored. This was demonstrated by the German zeppelin raids on Britain 
during WWI, and today dropping bombs from flying vehicles (mostly bombers) is well 
accepted, and sometimes even considered part of humanitarian missions. The Hague 
conventions and Geneva protocol were never officially scraped but they were ignored and 
became de-facto dead.     New agreements arose later on that drew inspiration from 
earlier conventions and protocols. But the more contemporary agreements, such as the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, were created mostly from scratch. Though the CWC is 
more effective than the earlier attempts at chemical weapons disarmament, the de-
legitimization of chemical weapons and the start of modern arms control and 
disarmament movements against new destructive weapons begins with the early Hague 
and Geneva agreements. 
 The Cold War.  
World War II, the most devastating war in history and was crucial for the 
development of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Chemical weapons were used sparingly in 
combat but due to the buildup towards the war and the technological drive of the war, 
chemical and biological weapons were far more dangerous than ever before. However it 
was the advent of nuclear weapons that ushered the world into a new era of arms control. 
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The emergence of the United Nations that was technically committed to preventing war 
and aggression meant the attitude ought to have been more favorable towards arms 
control. The nuclear triad, second strike capabilities, the immense nuclear stockpiles of 
the United States and the Soviet Union, and the increasing proliferation of nuclear 
weapons leading to intensifying potential for nuclear Armageddon, led to a sense of 
urgency for nuclear weapons arms control. What this was particularly concerned with 
was the number of nuclear weapons a state possessed, the quantity of the stockpile which 
is similar to all other arms control regimes, delivery mechanisms, which START deals 
with alongside quantity, and nuclear testing, which ramps up tensions and functions as a 
show of force and willingness to utilize these weapons. 
 Post-Cold War.  
The fall of the Soviet Union led to a dramatic lifting of tensions and lessened the 
chance for World War III while smaller scale wars continued. Arms control remains as 
important as ever. Nuclear standoff between the USA and Russia still exists to this day 
and tensions are increasing. Chemical weapons are back in the spotlight due to the Syrian 
Civil War. Nonetheless in many ways the post-cold-war era can be considered a golden 
age for arms control  and disarmament with many utopian ideals gaining increasing 
currency and certain regimes, such as the CWC and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty, offering the chance to advance arms control and peace further than ever before. 
Yet many of the same obstacles from earlier days remained and arms control still has 
many cracks in it. It may be that deterrence and force are keeping countries in line, rather 
than arms control regimes.  
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B. Theory behind Arms Control.  
Arms control is supposed to work to prevent war but when WMDs are involved 
deterrence arises as another effective method to prevent their use. It would appear that 
fear of retaliation does a decent job of keeping the use of WMDs in check. Chemical 
weapons in combat were notoriously absent from World War II. In truth, this is 
somewhat inaccurate, although examining when they were and were not used can inform 
ideas on what prevents their use. Treaties can be discarded as having no effect during the 
most devastating war in history. Morality certainly played a role, but considering the 
brutal and inhumane nature of World War II, this is not a convincing argument to fully 
explain non-use. Winston Churchill railed against hesitation to utilize chemical weapons, 
saying "it is absurd to consider morality on this topic when everybody used it in the last 
war without a word of complaint..."
57
 The Japanese utilized chemical warfare against the 
Chinese but did not use them against Western forces for fear of retaliation.
58
 Indeed 
before it even entered the war the United States did give warning that there would be 
consequences if Japan continued to use gas in China.
59
 Nazi Germany had an extensive 
chemical industry and chemical weapons stockpile and the Holocaust is history’s 
deadliest use of chemical weapons. Nazi Germany did in fact use gas on the Crimea 
peninsula to clear out Soviet soldiers and resistance folders from caverns and catacombs. 
It should be noted that the Allies had substantial stockpiles that were never used. 
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The reasons that gas during the Second World War was not used to the extent of 
World War I has several explanations. Much of the reluctance stems from the extensive 
use of chemical warfare in World War I. Akin to the Japanese both the Allies and 
Germany feared retaliation and maintained a no first-use policy even as stockpiles were 
readied for the possibility of a first-strike from the enemy. Other considerations helped to 
make sure that there was no first use by either side (with a few mentioned exceptions) but 
the fear of introducing a weapon of terror to the war was an important part. Infamously, 
Hitler was gassed during World War I and this has been supposed to have aided his 
reluctance to allow the use of chemical weapons. It is debatable how influential this was 
but the extensive use of chemical weapons during World War I left a scar on European 
populations and made all sides cautious of their use. More tactical considerations also 
meant that this use never occurred. Chemical weapons’ effectiveness is debatable. On one 
hand, they accounted for relatively few deaths (less than 1%) and even fewer victories 
during World War I.
60
 Their effectiveness is further decreased against well-trained and 
well-equipped armies, and when war is mobile compared to the trench warfare of the 
First World War. Nonetheless they are considered horrible weapons with great 
psychological impact, and can be effective to stall offensives or clear defensive positions. 
Allied military commanders (unlike Churchill) were concerned about the optics of using 
chemical weapons and were of the opinion that use in mainland Europe would not be 
tactically beneficial, with nerve gas in Normandy potentially doing more to stall the 
Allied invasion than aid it. The Germans had worries about Allied retaliation including 
concerns that the Allies had larger stockpiles than them and would use them on German 
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cities. In fact chemical weapons were removed from front-lines in Italy and Russia as 
German forces retreated out of fear that some commanders would use them to slow or 
halt the Allied advance (a task for which they would probably have been momentarily 
effective) and thus initiate far worse retaliation. In many cases the Germans also lacked 
the technical ability to properly deliver chemical weapons.
61
  
What can be understood from World War II in relation to chemical weapons is 
that both the Allies and the Axis were not overly concerned with any treaties or 
agreements. Rather they abstained from using chemical weapons because they either 
lacked the capability (China for instance which had no chemical weapons and could not 
retaliate against the Japanese), feared the moral opinion of civilian populations, or feared 
retaliation from the other side. However international norms do have role to play, as the 
concerns regarding global and domestic opinions did play a role in keeping chemical 
weapons use in check even if security concerns were a bigger concern in total war. The 
non-use of chemical weapons in World War II obviously did not prevent the war but may 
have lessened the destruction that occurred. Though considering this was an extremely 
destructive conflict anyhow, it may be something of a moot point.  
Mutual assured destruction seemed to prevent the Cold War from turning hot. In 
fact many Cold War technologies such as the Soviet Union’s Perimeter system, which 
was supposed to automatically trigger the launch of Soviet ICBM’s if a nuclear strike was 
detected using seismic, light, and radiation sensors, were primarily designed to keep 
mutually assured destruction assured through guaranteed retaliation. Deterrence can play 
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an important part in preventing war and the use of weapons. However this works better 
with nuclear weapons than chemical weapons (or any other sort of weapon) if history is 
any indication and there is still the risk of devastating war. It is important to acknowledge 
the uniqueness of nuclear weapons where one bomb, or nuclear tipped missile, is enough 
to level an entire city and leave deadly radiation in its wake. Nothing else approaches this 
level of devastation. Combined with current delivery systems this means that nowadays, 
nuclear weapons, and only nuclear weapons, guarantee mutual assured destruction. 
Theoretically deterrence could fail if nuclear weapons were abolished or even reduced to 
a low level, were war might be seen as acceptable. Arms control agreements during the 
Cold War did not harm deterrence; there were still enough weapons and enough risk to 
keep a mutually assured destruction alive. 
What can be gleamed from the histories of both chemical weapons during the 
World Wars and nuclear weapons during the Cold War is that though deterrence can be a 
good strategy for preventing any use of weapons of mass destruction, it does nothing to 
reduce stockpiles and only the complete elimination of WMD’s can truly prevent their 
potential use. In fact arms races often arise from deterrence and tensions are only 
increased. Arm’s control seeks to manage deterrence by keeping the number of weapons 
limited and controlled and thus prevent degeneration of an arms race into conflict. By 
solving the security dilemma, an arms race can be avoided as can the increase in tensions 
that often arises in such scenarios. After all, deterrence requires a level of preparing for 
war and willingness to go war, and arm’s control seeks to move states in an opposite 
directions.  
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The relation between disarmament and arms control is an interesting one. 
Weapons of mass destruction are particularly susceptible to attempts to do both. Arms 
control would appear to be easier to effect than disarmament. Nonetheless many states 
and supranational groups officially call for disarmament
62
. Of course the path to 
disarmament necessitates arms control. Attempts at nuclear disarmament have many 
supporters and have quite a history. Nuclear disarmament has also been criticized as 
overly idealistic and unilateral disarmament has been, and is deemed, unacceptable to 
both the USA and the USSR. The START, SORT, and SALT treaties are certainly not 
aimed at disarmament. However nuclear arms control, it could be argued, has been driven 
by hopes for total nuclear disarmament. In contrast the CWC seeks complete 
disarmament with the destruction of all chemical weapons and a ban on production. 
About 93% of the world’s chemical weapons stockpiles have been destroyed since the 
CWC took effect while more than 2/3 of the world’s nuclear weapons have been 
destroyed since the height of the cold war. In both the cases of nuclear and chemical 
weapons disarmament has not been achieved. For chemical weapons it is more likely, 
with Russia officially declaring the destruction of its entire stockpile on September 27, 
2017 and the USA committing to the complete destruction of its stockpiles (though 
cheating is a major concern). With nuclear weapons disarmament seems a distant 
possibility at best. This difference arises from the type of WMDs and their capabilities, 
with nuclear weapons, thanks to their destructive ability, being seen as necessary by 
superpowers with chemical weapons having no such distinction. 
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The taboo surrounding certain types of weapons is certainly beneficial, and 
perhaps necessary and for effective arms control and especially disarmament. There is a 
taboo on the use of weapons of mass destruction and even something similar regarding 
possession. This is particularly the case with chemical weapons which saw widespread 
use in World War I but by now have been, as Richard Price states, “stigmatized as 
morally illegitimate.”63 States do not want to be associated with chemical weapons. The 
Syrian state continually denies using them. Russia and the United States have committed 
to eradicating their stockpiles with previous stockpiles being kept purely for deterrence or 
research but nonetheless soon to be destroyed. Chemical weapons certainly have a 
psychological fear attached to them and present an unpleasant way to die but there are 
weapons that kill more people and are used far more often. There is a claim that the 
chemical weapons taboo arises because they are relatively ineffective militarily. 
Therefore they can be discarded without losing any potential military advantage. An 
argument goes that chemical weapons disarmament is less about lessening suffering and 
more about creating a playing field beneficial to Western military powers, particularly the 
United States. While there is something to arms control regimes being used to create 
certain, common, conditions for military combat, there is considerable disagreement 
regarding the idea that chemical weapons are militarily ineffective.  
The chemical weapons taboo transformed from a taboo against their use (as 
during much of World War II) to a taboo against its possession. Price finds that the 
chemical weapons taboo is one of “genuine moral rejection” arising from questioning 
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unrestricted warfare amongst the advanced industrialized great powers .
64
 Whatever the 
reasons for the taboo, two things can be ascertained: one is that use, and now possession 
(without intent to completely disarm) is considered taboo and an abnormal behavior 
amongst states. Two is that in spite of this taboo chemical weapons have been used  in 
Syria recently. 
There also exists a strong taboo against the use of nuclear weapons. Though there 
is a taboo against use of all weapons of mass destruction nuclear weapons are particularly 
interesting as there is no similar taboo on possession of nuclear weapons as of chemical 
and biological weapons. To be sure a taboo exists, particularly against proliferation 
outside the nuclear club, but in mainstream discourse the continued possession of nuclear 
weapons, with no need to move to disarmament, by certain states is legitimatized. 
However the taboo against the use of nuclear weapons is extremely strong, they have not 
seen combat use except for twice at the beginning of the new atomic age. The anti-use 
taboo is helped by the mass destruction they cause and that they possess the ability to 
devastate humanity to the point of extinction.  
On the other hand there is legitimacy in possessing weapons of mass destruction. 
This is not really the case with chemical weapons, but certainly is with nuclear weapons. 
India’s development of the atomic bomb is an example. The possession of nuclear 
weapons by the older possessor states is certainly recognized as legitimate and joining the 
nuclear club helps to legitimize the newer nuclear powers, for both domestic and 
international audience, as the equals of the great powers. The chemical weapons taboo is 
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such that any legitimacy that may have once been gained from their possession vanished 
by the 1990s at the latest and nowadays possession carries a great stigma instead. 
 Arms control is a failure if agreements are not followed and are simply 
unenforced words on paper. Violation and the lack of sufficient verification are the 
primary obstacles to successful implementation. There must be some checks to make sure 
that states do not cheat. It is in many regimes interest, or at least their perceived interest, 
to cheat if they can get away with it as WMDs can shift the balance of power. Thus the 
question of who enforces arms control treaties and how they do so emerges. Certain 
states have considerable clout, particularly the United States, and can work effectively to 
enforce arms control. However, enforcement and verification tends to be more effective if 
done by an international regime. These are likely to be trusted to a greater extent and are 
seen less so as an imposition of the will of a few states will on others for reasons that are 
inherently political. Still these international regimes cannot function without the support 
of some powerful states.
65
 And there is this sobering fact: modern-day arms control 
cannot be truly universal without support from all the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council.  
Verification 
To deal with verifications there must be somebody, whether it is an international 
arms control regime or an individual state, who is able to verify compliance. This is 
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significantly easier for bilateral agreements, as the USA and USSR could just agree to a 
certain quantity and type of inspections on each other and only have to negotiate between 
themselves regarding the parameters. They could also just send their own inspectors to 
check the other. Verification measures for multilateral regimes can be much more 
difficult, as there are more opportunities for distrust and likely logistical and diplomatic 
obstacles. When a goal of an arms control agreement is to include as many countries as 
possible, who does the verifying can be a tricky business due to distrust and tensions 
existing between nations, which is the reason that verification is necessary in the first 
place. To be sure, verification, especially of a thorough variety is bad for nations trying to 
cheat, which is exactly the point. This gets into questions of enforcement. An 
international inspection regime independent of world governments is preferable, with the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons being a good example. This helps 
smooth obstacles towards agreement allowing the comprehensive verification measures 
that must be undertaken in order to guarantee the success of arms control, and especially 
disarmament. 
The major issues with verification are refusal to allow inspections (which is true 
for those who refuse to sign the CWC) and cheating by keeping undeclared facilities and 
stockpiles. In the case of the United States, there is some domestic opposition to 
inspections in the USA, although that has not stopped verification measure in the START 
agreements from being used. There are supposed constitutional restrictions on arms 
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control, as stated by Koplow, but he adds this does not impede arms control so much as 
guide and shape the implementation of verification inspections.
66
  
Sampling is a common method for verification. It takes into account “statistical 
population may be altered to conceal a violation” resulting in a contest between the 
inspector and the inspected.
67
 This could be largely circumvented with comprehensive 
inspection of all appropriate facilities and stockpiles. This may be workable for 
disarmament, such as with chemical weapons, where the facilities are limited in number 
and the stockpiles are collected to be destroyed at a set number of locations, with the 
overlying notion that the party is committed to disarmament, and not hiding sarin in some 
hidden remote bunker. However for proper arms control it is harder and sampling may be 
the only method of verification as well as easier logistically. Sampling can still be 
successful however if proper models, procedures, and precautions are taken such as 
discussed at length by Dresher in 1962. Advances in verification technology and 
techniques means that if all facilities and stockpiles are open to inspection there is an 
increased likelihood that violations will be caught.  
 Another matter to keep in mind is that the inspectors, whether it be the OPCW or 
American or Russian inspectors, are looking for violations and cheating. This includes 
looking for undeclared stockpiles and facilities. This makes it increasingly difficult to 
cheat. At worst this can lead to a competition between the inspectors and the inspected. 
But this can be lessened if the inspector has substantial enough clout that if violations are 
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found the cost will be higher than the inspector is willing to deal with. For the OPCW this 
means support by major economic and military powers willing to intervene. For the USA 
and Russia it may mean the breakdown of the agreement and the removal of barriers to 
another arms race. It is generally in the best interest of the inspected to comply but they 
are more likely to do so if they have assurances that the other rival states are also 
complying, which inspections can provide.  
Enforcement 
Enforcement is another major part of arms control and ties in closely with 
verification. A state, particularly one closely adhering to realpolitik ideals, is more likely 
to adhere to arms control if another state, or an international coalition, sends signals that 
it would be costly to cheat. At the same time, it is beneficial to showcase benign intent 
and willingness to decrease to a lower level of armaments; a bare minimum necessary for 
deterrence, when there is still a lack of trust. There also ought to be an assurance that a 
state will not cheat and not capitalize on another states willingness to follow an arms 
control agreement. It is beneficial to arms control if violations are found for enforcement 
to be perceived as sure to both occur and to be damaging, whether through economic 
sanctions, or even military intervention. In order for sanctions to bite and military 
intervention to be realistic threat, it is quite important, and I believe necessary, for major 
power particularly the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, to be in 
agreement and willing to at least not oppose intervention, of an economic or military 
nature, in order for arms control to succeed.  
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Enforcement may take the form of economic and diplomatic sanctions and even 
military intervention. The point of enforcement is for the price for breaking an arms 
control agreement to be higher than what is gained by developing and possessing certain 
weapons technologies. Here is helps for power disparities to exist, if the violator is not a 
major power, and certainly hurts if the violator is a superpower. While theoretically 
economic and diplomatic sanctions could be placed on the United States this is near 
improbable given that this would be extremely detrimental to the world economy and 
likely for the cause of peace given the United States heavy involvement in the world 
(which is unlikely to end with sanctions) as well as a wide array of allies. Enforcement 
may appear to be easier for bilateral agreements, but this is troublesome as if one party 
withdraws from the agreement then it is effectively null and void and the other party has 
no reason to stick with the agreement, save for increasing diplomatic standing and 
seeking a propaganda coup.  
Financial cost is another obstacle to arms control. While successful arms control 
is beneficial cost-wise there are costs involved in enforcing and acceding to it. Where 
arms control and disarmament demands the destruction of weaponry cost can become a 
major factor. It does take a certain level of infrastructure and knowhow to destroy 
chemical and nuclear weapons. This cost can lessened if great powers destroy weapons or 
finance their destruction, although to lessen political tension this is best done with the 
possessor state accepting, and preferably asking for this aid. 
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Chapter Four: Case Studies 
I proffer that arms control does lessen tensions and does reduce destruction when 
war breaks out; however it is not the primary factor in the prevention of war. Arms 
control has the opposite effect of an arms race, if properly implemented, leading to 
decreased tension and solving the security dilemma. Whether or not this occurs relies on 
the effectiveness of the arms control regime and the willingness of actors to comply and 
to enforce these matters. Lacking this willingness means that the success of any arms 
control regime remains doubtful. Nonetheless, even if arms control regimes are unable to 
prevent use and/or stockpiling, and do not lead to total disarmament, they can limit the 
quantity of weapons to a considerable extent so as to lessen active use and to reduce 
tensions.  
I seek to answer, then, the primary question of whether arms control has reduced 
conflict and the likelihood of conflict amongst nations. This necessitates exploration of 
the secondary question: what makes arms control regimes and treaties successful? I 
examine the use and possession of chemical and nuclear weapons and their relations to 
arms control regimes. The primary actor in this is the state with its military and political 
power which has a major impact on interstate tensions and the success arms control 
regime. I consider the United States as the sole superpower in today’s world. The other 
permanent members of the UN Security Council are great powers, having particular 
influence on arms control. The members of the G7 can also be considered great powers 
but though not uninfluential in arms control discourse, Japan, Italy, Germany, and 
Canada are less important in crafting and enforcing arms control regimes.  
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When looking at the CWC, START, and other arms control treaties and regimes 
obviously one question is how effective the agreements are in doing what they set out to 
do and in preventing the use of weapons such as chemical weapons and nuclear weapons. 
The primary question which I seek to answer however is if arms control advances the 
cause of peace and lessens the devastation of war, preferably by preventing it. I think it is 
necessary to recognize that arms control alone cannot solve these issues, and that arms 
control agreements must be backed up by ideas and actions which advance peace and 
condemn the use of certain weapons. 
A. The Chemical Weapons Convention 
Until the advent of the Chemical Weapons Convention attempts to limit the use, 
production, and storage of chemical weapons via arms control can be considered failures. 
Chemical warfare was infamously utilized in World War I and much later Iraq used 
mustard gas against Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq War. During the Cold War 
chemical weapons stockpiles were present in many countries. There was even the 
possibility of expansion of stockpiles, with the UK in the 1980s considering redeveloping 
chemical weapons as a potential retaliatory measure against chemical attack.
68
 There 
were bilateral moves between the USA and the USSR regarding limiting chemical 
weapons but despite the stigma surrounding chemical weapons it appeared that most 
stockpiles would remain.  
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Why do states possess certain weapons is a question that must be answered in 
order for disarmament to proceed. Chemical weapons offer no legitimacy advantage. 
Rather the opposite is the case. Consequently it is security concerns that motivate 
possession. The imbalance in conventional military might is one which chemical 
weapons can partially alleviate, but nowhere near enough as the situation in Syria 
demonstrates, where chemical weapons have not granted the Syrian government decisive 
military advantage. Conventional military power is capable of countering the effects of 
chemical weapons, by striking from a distance, and  issuing soldiers with gas masks as 
was done amongst coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm in case of an Iraqi 
chemical attack. 
The Chemical Weapons Convention can be seen as a success: due to a drastic 
global reduction in chemical weapon stockpiles and the large number of nations that have 
acceded. There are 192 state parties to the CWC, and only Egypt, North Korea, and South 
Sudan have not signed the convention. Israel has signed but not ratified the CWC. In this 
measure, it is a success, with only four countries outside the CWC regime. But it is far 
from a complete success, as the chances of North Korea, Egypt, and Israel acceding are 
rather low. The CWC is also quite ambitious in its goal: the complete global elimination 
of chemical weapons. Yet, despite the ambitiousness of the goal it is strikingly close to 
reaching full disarmament. But again, achievement of this goal appears distant due to a 
few outliers. The CWC’s verification procedures are admirable and the Organization for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) providing a potential blueprint for future 
arms control regimes. What is especially                                                                                     
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encouraging about the CWC, and supporting its claim to success, is that 96 % of the 
worlds declared chemical weapons stockpile since the CWC took effect has been 
destroyed . And most countries that declared chemical weapons stockpiles have 
completely destroyed said stockpiles. Moreover, all declared production facilities have 
been inactivated as well.
69
  
What is potentially worrying for the CWC, despite its successes, is that chemical 
weapons have been employed by the Syrian government since 2014, when the OPCW 
certified Syria’s destruction of its entire declared stockpile. In March 2018 the UK sent 
the OPCW samples of a novichok nerve agent used to poison a former spy. The USSR 
developed the novichok agents and Russia is most likely to blame for the poisoning even 
though they deny possessing chemical weapons.
70
 With other states too, undeclared 
stockpiles are of major concern as are undeclared production facilities, which may not be 
functioning currently but can begin production quickly. Here enforcement comes into 
play as does finding undeclared stockpiles and facilities. There are two questions I intend 
to investigate: has chemical weapons disarmament via the CWC decreased tensions and 
chances of conflict? And has the CWC/OPCW regime even lowered the chances of 
chemical weapons being utilized in warfare? 
The OPCW regularly inspects all declared production facilities to verify that they 
have been shut down and destroyed, or converted to peaceful use. They are currently 
overseeing the destruction of the world’s remaining chemical weapons production 
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facilities (at least the declared ones).
71
 The OPCW’s inspection protocol has been 
modified throughout the years.
72
 This ability to evolve and adapt is important given the 
non-static nature of the world. Accedence to the CWC allows for OPCW inspections with 
heavy verification powers, including challenge inspections. If the OPCW was refused 
access to requested sites, not only would that be a violation of the CWC, it would surely 
lead to international outcry. It is telling that no state has tried such a thing (although the 
chance for cheating by non-declared facilities and stockpiles is always possible). 24/7 
inspections take place at chemical weapons destruction facilities, usually via CCTV due 
to hazardous conditions, to verify destruction.
73
 The chemical industry is also open to 
inspections by the CWC to verify that industrial actives are as reported and precursor 
chemicals are not being stockpiled for weapons production. If there are allegations of use 
or of prohibited production facilities, then a fact-finding challenge inspection can be 
undertaken at the request of another member state. While no investigation has taken place 
as outlined in the CWC the OPCW did participate in a joint mission with the UN to Syria 
to investigate the chemical attacks there in 2013. 
The Chemical Weapons Convention has prompted support for stockpile 
destruction and cooperation amongst states towards achieving it. The United States 
provided financial assistance to help destroy the Albanian, Libyan, and Russian 
stockpiles. Tensions were reduced, albeit temporarily, between Qaddafi’s Libya and the 
international community as sanctions against Libya were lifted and relations normalized 
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when it agreed to destroy its chemical weapons. Here complete disarmament seems to 
have aided relations and decreased the chances for conflict.
74
 The destruction of Russian 
chemical stockpiles allows the United States freedom to destroy its own stockpiles, with 
no need to keep a retaliatory stockpile. This benefits them both as no chemical arms race 
will take place between what were, by far the two largest possessors of chemical 
weapons. 
B. Successes and Failures: State Case Studies 
Of the countries that have signed and ratified the CWC it is only Iraq and the 
USA that have not yet destroyed their declared chemical weapons stockpile. Iraq’s 
chemical weapons were remnants from before 1991, were known to the UN, and not in a 
usable state.
75
However, Syria remains an open question and is a greater cause for concern 
than either Iraq or the USA. Syria is also the only country (besides perhaps the DPRK) 
where undeclared stockpiles are a major concern, and where the potential for use is 
profoundly feasible. And there is of course the issue of the states that have not signed and 
ratified the CWC, as all, save for South Sudan, appear unlikely to do so anytime soon.  
Albania had a large stockpile of chemical weapons with 16,678 kg of mustard 
gas, lewisite, adamsite, and chloroacetophenone. Albania signed the CWC in 1993, and 
declared a stockpile in 2003. This decision was potentially forced by the discovery of 
large quantities of mustard gas in several abandoned bunkers in 2002. Albania destroyed 
its chemical weapons at a cost of 48 million USD and complete destruction was 
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confirmed by the OPCW on July, 11 2007.
76
 The USA assisted and funded operations to 
destroy the weapons.
77
 Albania’s willingness to disarm, and ability to receive outside 
assistance to do so, benefitted from a different regime declaring and destroying the 
chemical weapons from the Hoxha regime that had initially created the massive stockpile.  
India ratified the CWC in 1996 but at the time said it did not possess chemical 
weapons. However, in June 1997, India declared 1,045 tons of mustard gas and 
committed to destroying this stockpile by 2009. This has been verified by the OPCW. 
India has a large chemical industry which benefits from Indian acceding to the CWC as it 
avoids potential sanctions for not doing so and allows Indian chemicals to be traded 
freely.
78
 Thus accession removed potential obstacles to commerce and benefitted India’s 
economy. India acquired chemical weapons in response to Pakistan’s supposed 
acquisition of chemical agents and India acceded to the CWC knowing that Pakistan did 
so as well. Earlier India and Pakistan had signed an agreement for the complete 
prohibition of chemical weapons and that committed both states to sign the CWC. Even 
though India did later declare a stockpile after earlier claiming it did not have one, 
nowadays it is near certain that both states have no chemical weapons stockpiles.
79
 
Tensions are still high between India and Pakistan, and there were many reasons that are 
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more influential than chemical weapons. Nonetheless, their destruction eliminated one 
source of potential tension and the chance for a potential chemical arms race.
80
 
The India- Pakistan Agreement on Chemical Weapons was signed in 1992 and 
provided for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons; committing both nations to 
not develop, possess, or use chemical weapons, or to assist or encourage such activity. It 
also committed them to sign the CWC. Both nations signed it and both ratified it as well; 
India in 1996 and Pakistan in 1997. When the India-Pakistan Agreement was signed 
neither country declared a chemical stockpile. India later did so and Pakistan claimed that 
India used chemical weapons in Kashmir in 1999. India may not have used chemical 
weapons in Kashmiri; this claim was never investigated by the OPCW, and not 
surprisingly, was denied by India. But India certainly possessed chemical weapons in 
violation of the India-Pakistan Agreement. India’s commitment to the agreement was in 
serious doubt, as evidenced by its clear violation of it. However India’s commitment and 
compliance to the CWC is not under any such scrutiny.  
There are two questions concerning India’s chemical weapons: one; why does 
India adhere CWC while it did not follow the India-Pakistan Agreement, and two; was 
the CWC really the reason for Indian disarmament. I contend that the answer to the 
second question is yes. As for the first question, and the reason why there is an 
affirmative answer for the second question, I believe it comes down to the arms control 
regime, and the CWC’s regime is far better and more complex, with more verification 
and enforcement capabilities, than the India-Pakistan Agreement.  
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The India and Pakistan Agreement was not lengthy by any means, lacking 
complexity and capacity, and was reached independent of any other issues, such as the 
Kashmir dispute, which remains a higher point of tension than any arms control matter. 
The India Pakistan agreement was probably most useful in leading to the CWC being 
adopted by both countries, which would in turn lead to the destruction of chemical 
weapons in South Asia. Adoption of the CWC were points 2 and 3 of the agreement, and 
these were a success as both countries did accede to the CWC, and no longer possess any 
chemical weapons.
81
 However point 1 of the India-Pakistan agreement which prohibited 
development, production, and use of chemical weapons can be deemed as a failure, given 
that India did continue to possess chemical weapons after the agreement was signed. I 
believe this has to do with one major missing piece of the India Pakistan agreement; in 
contrast to the CWC no regime, or any method at all, was established for verification and 
implementation of the agreement. Certainly no regime or verification organization 
independent of the Indian and Pakistani governments was every even discussed. And one 
of the benefits of the CWC is the independent and empowered OPCW. Bilateral 
agreements can have verification regimes to push this forward, such as the case is with 
the START treaties. But India and Pakistan had no verification measures with each other 
regarding chemical weapons. This meant that India could continue to develop and 
possess chemical weapons with no consequences as long as Pakistan remained unaware 
of this, which is considerably easier with no verification measures in.  
The CWC completely changed this as now India felt compelled to declare and 
destroy its chemical stockpile (no doubt aided by the relative non-necessity of chemical 
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weapons). That the CWC had a sophisticated regime behind it, was backed by major 
powers, and had extensive verification measures compelled India for two reasons. One 
was that the CWC regime and the support behind disarmament (including within India, 
this was as much a voluntary movement as one that caused by outside circumstances) 
meant that it was in India’s best interests to eliminate their chemical weapons and cohere 
to the international norm on this matter, avoiding becoming a pariah in any way. At the 
same time India’s major rival Pakistan would have to accede to similar forces, or risk 
international disapproval and potential condemnation. Thus Pakistan would be assured to 
either not possess chemical weapons, or to be dealt a blow internationally, either one in 
India’s interest.  
The destruction of chemical weapons in South Asia may be helpful in the limited 
mitigation of conflict. Any use of chemical weapons by India or Pakistan would lead to 
condemnation by the other state (and the international community) leading to increased 
tensions and the potential for retaliation by chemical means, larger scale conventional 
operations, or even the threat of nuclear retaliation. Chemical weapons in short would not 
decrease tensions in South Asia and would risk ratcheting them up instead. That being 
said I believe the nuclear factor to be of much greater importance in South Asia, and also 
much more difficult to eradicate. The ascension of India and Pakistan to the CWC and the 
destruction of their chemical weapons has done little to promote peace, and tensions are 
still high, particularly over Kashmir. Any actual fighting has been very limited, not due to 
the CWC but because both sides recognize that a large scale war would be disastrous, 
especially with nuclear weapons. I ascertain that India’s disarmament is beneficial, but 
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only slightly for reducing the level of conflict between India and Pakistan, by taking 
chemical weapons off the table, while at the same time doing nothing to prevent conflict 
itself. 
There was a “state party” to the CWC that declared a chemical stockpile and then 
destroyed its stockpiles. South Korea is strongly suspected of formerly possessing a 
chemical weapons program and most probably was this party. South Korea is also still at 
war with North Korea. Arm’s control and disarmament may be able to reduce tensions, 
but if it is not bilateral it cannot do so. And in this instance it appears the South Korean 
chemical disarmament has had no effect on tensions between the two Koreas.  
Libya developed chemical weapons with a large production facility at Rabta but 
this was rendered inactive by UN sanctions. These sanctions led to Libya abandoning all 
their WMD programs on December 19, 2003 in order to lift sanctions and normalize 
international relations. They destroyed much of their CW stockpiles from February 27 to 
March 3, 2004 under supervision of the OPCW. Then on March 5, 2004 they declared 23 
tons of mustard gas and acceded to the CWC on June 2004. Libya is intriguing as they 
acceded to the CWC under heavy diplomatic and economic pressure. Though not under 
an open threat of military attack, given relations between the West and Qaddafi, this 
would have been probable enough to be something that Libya kept in mind when it 
decided to accede to the CWC and international norms. Iraq had also recently been 
invaded and Saddam Hussein overthrown and captured on the premise of possessing 
WMD’s perhaps leading the Libyan regime to believe that continuing its WMD program 
and possession was dangerous for its survival as well as detrimental for the country’s 
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economy and international relations. However the primary motivation was the stagnation 
of Libya’s economy and its need for international investment as well as a desire to 
normalize relation with the West. To add to this Libya’s WMD program was not all that 
successful according to some observers, and was far less important to Qaddafi then 
ending Libya’s existing pariah status. Libya’s disarmament has portions of a success 
story of peaceful disarmament and how disarmament can be effective. Though pressured 
by international orders and domestic concerns Libya was the one who approach the UK 
and USA and offered to give up their WMD program. Libya not only agreed to abide by a 
variety of treaties (it would also dismantle its nuclear program and put limits on it 
missiles) but also was subject to immediate and comprehensive verification inspections.
82
 
In a showcase of the relative perception of nuclear vs. chemical weapons, a perception 
that is close to the reality of the matter in my view, Libya’s nuclear program was 
dismantled first and rather quickly with the aid of the United States. When the Libyan 
Revolution broke out the destruction of Libya’s chemical weapons was still ongoing. 
There were fears that some may have fallen into the hands of militants but in 2016 the 
last stockpile of precursor chemicals was sent abroad with the assistance of the OPCW 
and Denmark, the UK, and Finland.
83
 The case of Libya shows that disarmament can be 
effective, and beneficial for peace, if it is widely supported the regime disarming and by 
more powerful states, and there are proper verification measures and a real potential for 
enforcement.  
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The Russian Federation declared a chemical weapons arsenal of 39, 967 tons in 
1997. Due to the scale of the stockpile and financial difficulties Russia passed extended 
deadlines for destruction but continued to dispose of its chemical weapons in multiple 
facilities throughout the country. Russia finally destroyed its entire declared stockpile on 
September 27, 2017. However Russia allegedly has a considerable quantities of 
undeclared chemical agents, including the novichok agents, which are rumored to be 
deadlier than any other known chemical agent.
84
 They also allegedly used novichok 
agents to try and kill Sergei Skripal in March of 2018.
85
 
The United States of America began reductions in its stockpile in the 1980s and in 
1991 President George H.W. Bush committed the USA to destroy its entire chemical 
weapons stockpile. The majority of the US stockpile, close to 90%, has been destroyed 
with only 2 out of 9 chemical weapon depots remaining. The United States declared 
27,771 tons of chemical weapons and currently has 2,770 tons. The United States 
estimates that it will eliminate its entire stockpile by 2023. Though it is moving relatively 
slowly the United States does appear committed and will almost certainly destroy its 
declared stockpile within the not too distant future, probably meeting the 2023 deadline.
86
 
The same cannot be said for the Syrian Arab Republic which perpetrated chemical 
attacks during the Syrian Civil War even after it acceded to the CWC and the OPCW 
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verified the destruction of Syria’s declared stockpile in 2014.87 Syria was late to join the 
CWC and only did so at the behest of the international community, including Russia, and 
with the threat of a United States-led military intervention hanging over the regime’s 
head.
88
  
Russia, an ally of the Syrian government, played a major role in the destruction of 
Syria’s chemical weapons. The US was threatening to, and willing, to carry out air strikes 
against the Syrian government in response to chemical attacks, a brazen crossing of the 
“red line” outlined by President Obama.89 Substantial US military intervention against 
Assad would have heightened tensions in an already tense situation between the USA and 
its allies and Iran and Russia, major allies of the Assad government. The United States 
has attacked Syrian government forces a few times but it has been limited and in response 
to very specific infractions, including chemical attacks but also approaching US-backed 
forces, with Russia being notified beforehand if Russian forces are nearby.
90
 The 
potential response to chemical attacks in 2013 promised to be much more devastating, 
with the potential to change the tide of the war. Russia preferred that the United States 
not directly attack the Syrian government, and potentially topple a Russian ally in the 
region, one which hosted Russian military bases. Thus a deal was reached to eliminate 
Syria’s chemical stockpile and Syria acceded to the CWC.  
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Oddly enough, Syria presents a potential case in favor for arms control and 
disarmament lessening tension and conflict. The deal structured to get Syria to accede to 
the CWC and destroy its stockpile helped prevent the United States from becoming 
heavily involved and clashing with Russia and Iran even more than has already happened. 
There was considerable cooperation between the international community and the great 
powers to disarm Syria of its declared stockpile whereas. UN security council resolution 
2118 required Syria to follow a timeline for the destruction of its chemical weapons and 
production facilities, and was supported by all 15 of the Security Council’s members. 
This cooperation has not occurred since then with Russia keeping the Syrian government 
insulated from repercussions for continuing to use chemical weapons afterwards. In 2017 
Russia blocked attempts by the United States and its allies to renew probes into chemical 
weapon use in Syria. By preventing full disarmament Russia has only increased tensions 
between it and the West, as well as worsened the situation in Syria.  
The Syrian government certainly still possesses chemical weapons and has used 
them but it cannot be denied that its stockpile has been massively reduced. Despite claims 
that all Syrian chemical weapons were destroyed by 2014, Western intelligence agencies 
have long suspected Syrian “cheating.”91 Still, a reduced stockpile should in theory be 
beneficial, but even if the stockpile is significantly reduced the continued use of chemical 
weapons in warfare makes arms control attempts surrounding it largely a failure. 
However Syria certainly has considerably less capability with estimates that only 1% of 
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its original stockpile remains.
92
 The partial disarmament of Syria mean they cannot 
launch multiple large scale chemical weapons attacks and it is possible that if Syria had 
destroyed none of its weapons the war would be even more brutal, especially for 
civilians.
93
 
Of the states that have not yet acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
South Sudan is undoubtedly the least concerning. On December 1, 2017 South Sudan 
announced that it “has all but concluded the process of joining the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.” The given reasoning behind this decision was that 
South Sudan would like to associate themselves with the “noble goals and objectives” of 
the OPCW.
94
 South Sudan gained independence in 2011 and as a young nation it is not 
too surprising that it had not acceded to the CWC especially considering the internal 
problems, including a civil war, that are still occurring. South Sudan also never 
possessed, nor attempted to possess, chemical weapons. The commitment to accede to the 
CWC appears to stem from a want to join the community of nations and align itself with 
what is globally seen as a” noble cause”. By taking this step South Sudan helps to 
integrate itself better in the international community, removing a potential obstacle to 
South Sudan receiving assistance to rebuild, and perhaps even benefitting global peace, 
however slightly. However the other states that have yet to ratify the CWC and join the 
OPCW will be much more difficult to convince than South Sudan and they also threaten 
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to be much more impactful for global questions of war and peace surrounding chemical 
weapons. 
 There is substantial tension between North Korea and the international 
community, and the DPRK is not expected to dispose of its chemical weapons or accede 
to the CWC anytime soon. Given the secrecy surrounding the DRPK there are only broad 
estimates regarding its chemical weapons stockpile with South Korean intelligence 
estimating between 2,500 and 5,000 tons, with some of them likely stationed near the 
DMZ.
95
 Tensions surrounding the DPRK stemming from weaponry are not centered on 
chemical weapons so much as ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, which are 
particularly prominent nowadays, but chemical weapons still remain part of the DPRK’s 
military equation. Any agreement with the DPRK to eliminate or even reduce its 
chemical stockpile, though unlikely to occur, would foreseeably reduce tension 
considerably, not least because it opens up the door for the international community to 
negotiate with the DPRK about other arms control measures and perhaps the 
normalization of relations. 
Egypt deployed phosgene and mustard gas during the North Yemeni Civil War in 
the 1960s and still maintains a chemical weapons capability. The size of the current 
Egyptian arsenal is substantial but unknown. Egypt possesses chemical weapons as a 
deterrence measure in an attempt to neutralize Israeli military power and nonconventional 
retaliatory options.
96
 Since 1993 Egypt has a policy of refusing to sign the CWC and not 
destroying its chemical weapons until Israel accedes to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
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Treaty. For Egypt chemical weapons are a counterweight towards Israeli nuclear weapons 
but they are just as much a bargaining chip to attempt to bargain away the Israeli nuclear 
arsenal.  
Israel also possesses chemical weapons, though its stockpile is undeclared and its 
size is unknown. Israel has signed the CWC but has not ratified it. Israel maintains an 
arsenal as a counter to chemical weapon stockpiles in antagonistic Arab states, primarily 
Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. Israel refuses to ratify the CWC as long as other Middle Eastern 
States possesses chemical weapons and refuse to recognize Israel. This is fairly consistent 
with the Israeli regional outlook and their concern with WMD’s throughout the Middle 
East. In 1997 Defense Minister Yitzhak Mordechai about ratifying the CWC said, “I 
think that we have to wait and see how things develop. The problem is that some of the 
states in the region are not signing, and there is no way of inspecting those who are [not 
signing].”97 Egypt does recognize Israel and Syria has acceded to the CWC, but they both 
still possess chemical weapons and there is cause for Israeli security concerns. 
Consternation about Iran (which does not possess chemical weapons) has become 
particularly pronounced in recent years, adding to concerns about Egypt’s refusal to sign 
the CWC and Syria’s continued use of chemical weapons This likely means that until 
these issues are solved, or a deal is reached that includes Egypt ratifying the CWC and 
Syria actually adhering to the CWC is reached, Israel will remain a non-party for the 
foreseeable future. 
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 Egypt and Israel could reduce tension between themselves and in the region if 
they acceded to the CWC. If one state does not possess chemical weapons stockpile there 
may be no need for the other state to acquire a corresponding stockpile for deterrence or 
to develop other countermeasures that are more than just defensive in response. There are 
certainly political costs for not acceding to a treaty that the rest of the world’s states, save 
the DPRK, will accede to and more international isolation is possible.
98
 There are also 
potential benefits if either Egypt or Israel unilaterally ratifies the CWC and destroys their 
chemical stockpile. This puts increased political and moral pressure on the other state to 
disarm as well. Bilateral ratification, but even unilateral ratification, would improve 
international perception and lead to decreased tensions between two historically 
antagonistic regional powers.
99
  
C. START and New START  
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty builds on START I and SORT 
(Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) as well as the earlier SALT I and SALT II which 
were talks (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) that led to agreements between the USA 
and the USSR. SALT I led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) which 
stood until June 2002 when the United States withdrew. The ABM treaty was agreed 
upon to prevent an arms race with the advent of anti-ballistic missiles which threatened to 
defend against ballistic missiles (which would be nuclear tipped). The arms race would 
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stem from each state attempting to gain an advantage over the other by honing their 
ability to stop the other’s missiles while improving their offensive capability so that their 
missiles would get through. This was more dangerous than just any arms race as it risked 
shattering mutual assured destruction; the entire basis for nuclear deterrence. The ABM 
Treaty limited ABM placement to around Washington D.C. and Moscow and ICBM silos 
and limited each state to 100 anti-ballistic missiles thus assuring that the nuclear deterrent 
would remain.
100
  
As the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty’s eventual collapse demonstrates, a major 
problem with bilateral agreements is that they terminate if one party withdraws, leaving 
the other state no reason to stick to the agreement and increasing the potential for an arms 
race, or at least removing obstacles to such an arms race occurring. Indeed in 2015 
Vladimir Putin said it was not military conflicts but decisions such as “US unilateral 
withdrawal from the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty” that lead to a Cold War. This ought to 
be taken with a grain of salt. After all military conflicts do increase tensions and can help 
cause a Cold War. But the failure of arms control agreements does so as well. Unilateral 
withdrawal changes the global security landscape for the worse, exacerbating it with by 
causing a decrease in trust and added uncertainty. 
As of 2017 the USA and Russia have over 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. 
All countries are well below the limits set by New START, save for the USA and 
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Russia.
101
  Thus a bilateral treaty can lessen not only bilateral tensions but also global 
tensions. Although this is less the case nowadays then during the Cold War, tensions and 
conflict between the USA and Russia still affect the rest of the world and Europe in 
particularly. If nuclear war were to break out between these two countries the global 
climate consequences alone would be devastating. Russia and the USA are more 
important for the global state of war and peace than most countries due to their military 
preeminence, their mass nuclear arsenals, and the risk that many of the other nuclear 
powers might follow the American and Russian lead. At the very least it is hard to 
conceive of a world where any country has more nuclear weapons than the USA or 
Russia and thus bilateral arms control matters a great deal. New START and START 
reduced the world’s nuclear stockpile considerably, with START I leading to a mass 
reduction in the global number of nuclear arms.
102
 
START III was a proposed nuclear disarmament treaty between the United States 
and Russia that sought to drastically reduce both countries’ nuclear arsenals to no more 
than 2,000 or 2,500 strategic nuclear warheads with the potential for a limit of only 1,500 
nuclear warheads per country. Measures would be negotiated regarding the transparency 
of nuclear warhead stockpiles and their destruction with the aim to promote the 
irreversibility of these reductions. However negotiations fell through. The United States 
Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly opposed Russian proposals to reduce stockpiles to 1,500 or 
fewer warheads. Russia strongly opposed NATO’s eastward expansion and the American 
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plan to build a missile defense system in Europe (which could potentially render Mutual 
Assured Destruction moot) and hinted that START III would be subject to the resolving 
of these issues.
103
 These treaties do not occur in a vacuum. Difficulties in reaching any 
arms control agreement largely stem from other events and concerns. The impasse in 
START III negotiations led to the weaker Treaty Between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT). The SORT treaty 
was in force from June 2003 to February 2011 and limited the nuclear arsenal to 1,700-
2,200 deployed warheads each.
104
 Though less than hoped for this was still a massive 
reduction from the numbers maintained during the Cold War.
105
 
The New START (Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
of Strategic Offensive Arms) was signed on April 8, 2010 and entered into force on 
Feburary,5 2011 as the successor to SORT. It lasts till 2021 with the potential to extend 
the treaty till 2026. It is unclear what will replace New START if anything (I expect 
some agreement will be reached and hope that it continue to reduce nuclear capabilities). 
New START reduced the number of strategic missile launchers by half (arms control by 
limiting delivery mechanisms), and limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads to 
1,550. It limits the number of deployed and non-deployed Intercontinental Ballistic 
Missiles, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and Submarine Ballistic 
Missiles, all the legs of the nuclear triad, to 800 and the number of these delivery 
mechanism that are deployed to 700. For verification purposes New START allows for 
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satellite and remote monitoring of most of these delivery mechanisms, and for 19 on-site 
inspections per year.
106
 However. New START does not place limits on operationally 
inactive nuclear warheads in stockpile, which both the USA and Russia have thousands 
of and can quickly attach to missiles or to bombers if tensions should increase to such a 
point where this might be deemed necessary. The hope is that New START will decrease 
the chances of this happening by 1) preventing a nuclear arms race through placing 
numerical limits on delivery mechanisms and nuclear warheads and 2) allowing nuclear 
deterrence centered on mutual assured destruction to continue. 
As a bilateral treaty New START does nothing towards limiting nuclear 
proliferation, though it helps decrease global anxiety. However as a means to globally 
reduce the number of nuclear arms and a prevent nuclear arms race it has at the potential 
to be highly effective. This is because the USA and Russia being the largest nuclear 
powers by far. It is possible that other nuclear countries may follow the lead of the USA 
and Russia, particularly the USA’s NATO allies. The UK developed nuclear weapons as 
a deterrent to the Soviet Union, with uncertainty over whether America would fight for 
Britain and risk potential annihilation. If Russia does not pose a major threat, particularly 
a nuclear threat, then the UK nuclear arsenal would be unnecessary. Of course, this 
would have to be true for other potential threats but if the USA and Russia disarm it is 
highly unlikely that the UK won’t follow suit. The primary use of this bilateral treaty is 
that even though it involves only two players, these two players are the ones capable of 
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bringing about nuclear Armageddon, as well as wielding influence over other nuclear 
powers. 
D. Nuclear Faceoff: Case Studies 
When discussing nuclear weapons and their relation to arms control treaties I 
examine nuclear deterrence and what role this has in reducing, or increasing, the chances 
of war and tensions that increase conflict in the periphery. The mitigation of war is not as 
much of an issue in regards to war between the USSR and the USA with prevention of 
any war being the goal. Conventional war would be devastating enough and nuclear war 
would be on another level of destruction with very real potential for the annihilation of 
both states. Nuclear arms control is different from other sorts with its focus being purely 
on prevention of any war with nuclear weapons, rather than also the mitigation of a 
conflict. Most arms control regimes seek prevention of war with certain weapons, but if 
full scale war does break out between two powers, both armed with say cluster bombs, 
there is still reasonable hope that the use of these weapons may be prevented. Even if 
these weapons are used, devastating though it may be, they would not overly threaten the 
security of either state any more than war without them would, nor cause entire cities to 
be destroyed in an instant and regional, and perhaps world, ecosystems to be severely 
damaged. The unique devastation caused by a single nuclear weapon and the 
improbability of preventing nuclear attacks if attempted, completely changes the 
equation. It is absolutely vital, then, to prevent nuclear war at any cost.  
As far as nuclear weapons go no nuclear threat is minor but it can be reasonably 
said that during the height of the Cold War the nuclear confrontation between the USA 
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and Russia dwarfed other nuclear threats. Nowadays North Korea has nuclear weapons 
and has had recent confrontations with Japan, South Korea, and the United States. The 
DPRK is seemingly impervious to arms control agreements, though not necessarily to 
economic sanctions and military threat. It is however rational for The DPRK to continue 
its nuclear program as a method to try and guarantee the regimes survival. Pakistan and 
India are also nuclear armed and the risk of nuclear war on that front may be higher than 
between the USA and Russia. There is also a question about what to do if a nuclear 
armed Iran should arise. Many of these countries with smaller nuclear arsenals pose a 
greater threat to world security due to the increased chance that they make use of their 
nuclear weapons or make use of a nuclear shield to act aggressively in the region. Of 
course the United States and Russia are not immune from this, and although the chances 
they use their nuclear arsenals can reasonably be considered lower, this does not mean 
that the chances nuclear weapons anywhere in the world will be used is too high. The 
probability is higher than is comfortable to be sure, but that has more to do with the 
devastation these weapons cause than with the probability of use.  
Another potential to be an outlier is Iran. There is no indication that Iran has any 
interest in chemical weapons and they do accede to the CWC. However they may very 
well develop nuclear weapons even though there is an agreement currently in place to 
attempt and prevent that from happening. Anything on Iran is speculative, but a nuclear-
armed Iran would be worse for the Middle East, Israel already has nuclear weapons and 
Saudi Arabia may very well obtain them if Iran does as well. Thus, the mini-cold war, 
that is already occurring, will reach new heights and the stability-instability paradox will 
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hold true resulting in a more violent Middle East. At the same time the Iranian regime 
would probably feel more secure with a few nuclear weapons.
107
 I do not think it is likely 
for a nuclear arms control agreement to be implemented, without significant outside 
pressure anyhow, between Iran and Israel. The lack of an agreement would make the 
situation worse. 
The United States and Russia have intervened militarily in other state’s affairs 
many times in the 21
st
 century, and can do so without threat of military reprisal by the 
other, which in my view is due largely to the nuclear umbrella (as well as the absurd cost 
of a conventional war). The nuclear umbrella is present as long as mutual assured 
destruction is. War between the United States and Russia threatens to be far more 
devastating than any conflict ever seen and this was even more so the case during the 
Cold War. Mass decreases in each state’s nuclear arsenals may be little comfort as 
nowadays the Russian and American arsenals are capable of basically destroying the 
other state, causing major worldwide ecological catastrophe, and potentially even causing 
human extinction.
108
  
Nuclear Disarmament  
The obstacles to nuclear weapons disarmament are so ferocious as to make it 
extremely unlikely. If the world ever hopes to get there, and there is not an unreasonable 
case to be made that this would be dangerous, arms control is a necessary step forwards. 
Nuclear weapons arms control works best in conjunction with the nuclear deterrent. A 
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nuclear arsenal is the best deterrent, not just against nuclear attack but also other forms of 
attack, including a chemical one, and getting rid of nuclear weapons and thus the nuclear 
deterrent, would increase the chances for war. War arising from of the spiraling of the 
security dilemma can be prevented if the nuclear deterrent promises mutual assured 
destruction. But disarmament would mean no mutual assured destruction and thus 
increased potential for war. This is not assured to occur but it is too likely in the current 
world system and thus far too much of a risk for Russia and the USA to take a chance on 
nuclear disarmament. Unilateral nuclear disarmament is a non-starter for the USA or 
Russia. We should not think of disarmament as a complete impossibility though, but 
rather should recognize the obstacle currently preventing it from being seriously 
considered. 
When examining nuclear disarmament it would be particularly instructive to look 
at two countries that relinquished their nuclear weapons. This would seem to be an odd 
choice given that nuclear weapons are commonly asserted to be the most powerful 
weapons in the world, conferring legitimacy and status upon the possessor state, and 
assuring security via nuclear deterrence. In fact part of the reason that the Ukraine and 
South Africa were willing to give up nuclear weapons was because it actually benefited 
their status and legitimacy, and was not seen as being that vital to security compared to 
the legitimacy gained. Ukraine is an intriguing case as it inherited nuclear weapons from 
the Soviet arsenal, an arsenal that Russia claimed the entirety of as the successor state to 
the USSR. Russia did have a level of legitimacy in their claim to nuclear weapons under 
Ukrainian control. Ukraine was also encouraged by the USA and NATO to give up its 
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nuclear arsenal, supportive as they were of Russia’s successor claim in the relatively 
optimistic days soon after the fall of the Soviet Union. This encouragement was vital as 
Ukraine looked to the West for support. Ukraine also had adopted an anti-nuclear 
weapons stance as part of their struggle for independence, attempting to distance 
themselves from the Soviet Union which was partially defined by its nuclear arsenal. This 
is due largely to nuclear proliferation norms which threatened to place a potentially 
dissenting Ukraine as a “rouge state” like Iraq or North Korea.109 There were later 
questions about whether Ukraine’s disarmament was the wisest choice given the War in 
the Donbass and Russia’s annexation of the Crimea. It is far less plausible that Russia 
would be so aggressive towards a nuclear-armed Ukraine. This is a potential counterpoint 
to nuclear disarmament; without the ultimate weapon to counter other disparities a state 
opens itself to aggression.  
Perhaps even more vital in studying the potential for nuclear disarmament and 
what pushes states to give up weapons of mass destruction is the case of South Africa. An 
increasingly isolated South Africa, under the apartheid regime, developed nuclear 
weapons by the 1980s and had six bombs by 1989 when they discontinued their nuclear 
program, destroyed their nuclear bombs, and even acceded to the treaty on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons in 1991. Apartheid South Africa may have also had a 
chemical weapons program but this was also discontinued completely (if it even existed, 
which is likely, though to what extent is not clear). Of course by 1991 South Africa was 
changing and the Apartheid regime would soon peacefully give way to modern day South 
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Africa. One theory holds that South Africa dismantled its bombs due to a radical 
reduction in external security threats. Cuban forces withdrew from Angola, where South 
African forces had clashed with them in the 1980s, Namibia, where there had been 
fighting and insurgency, was granted independence from South Africa, and the risk of 
Soviet sponsored attack was eliminated with the fall of the Eastern Bloc.
110
 I certainly 
believe there is a large amount of truth to this theory but I also believe that in order to 
explain complete  nuclear disarmament internal political changes must also be credited.  
In 1989 F.W. de Klerk was elected and in 1994 the new South Africa would 
emerge. Some of the end of Apartheid was due to the end of the Cold War but the process 
began in the late 80s. The end of the Cold War cannot fully explain South Africa’s 
willingness to disarm. The Apartheid regime almost certainly feared nuclear weapons 
being in the hands of the ANC (or even potentially white extremist) and thus decided to 
dismantle them.
111
 While there is no concrete evidence to support this (and the Apartheid 
regime would have kept that well under wraps) it is near certain these concerns did play a 
major role in South Africa’s decision to disarm. This domestic reasoning behind this 
disarmament does suggest that nuclear disarmament in the vein of South Africa is, at 
best, extremely unlikely. 
There have been suggestions to put nuclear weapons, or the capability to create 
nuclear weapons, under international control. Any sort of exclusive international control 
over any weapon is basic non-starter without any reasonable chance of happening. As 
long as nation-states are dominant on the world stage I see almost no chance for this sort 
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of idealism to be implemented and will not discuss it further. Arms control that is 
implemented by an international body rather than as agreements between nation states is 
also unlikely. This is as true for chemical as for nuclear weapons. However nuclear 
weapons can reasonably be controlled through agreements between a few states given the 
difficulty of nuclear proliferation and the guards in place against it. These anti-
proliferation measures must also be controlled by agreement and cooperation. This is not 
to say that international bodies and regimes, independent from nation-states, do not have 
a role to play, indeed as the Organization for the Prohibition for Chemical Weapons 
shows they can be vital. 
Why States Possess Nuclear Weapons 
The nuclear deterrent and security concerns are the primary motivations for the 
nuclear arsenals of India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel and until the security 
situations in these regions improve there is no reason to hope that disarmament may take 
place worldwide. Arms control is still quite possible and can be quite beneficial if it does 
manage to reduce tensions, or at least prevent them from rising. The security concerns 
these states face however go much deeper and the chance of solving any of them in our 
lifetime is unlikely. These states are all outside of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and as long as they possess weapons the USA and Russia will almost 
certainly do so as well. The United States’ NATO allies and close non-NATO allies (such 
as South Korea, Japan, and Australia) rely at least partially on the American nuclear 
deterrent for security. This was particularly accurate during the Cold War, but is still true 
today. There is steep imbalance in conventional military forces worldwide which makes 
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disarmament improbable and arms control potentially difficult. Nuclear arsenals, even 
small ones, help to alleviate any conventional imbalance as is the case with Russia. With 
enough nuclear weapons to destroy the United States it does not matter that the United 
States conventional military is far and away the best in the world, with a military budget 
that dwarfs any other country and a clear superiority in its navy and air force. But 
American conventional military superiority is no threat to Russia thanks to Russia’s 
immense nuclear deterrent. Thus any nuclear-armed country that is concerned about the 
United States is unlikely to disarm or decrease its capabilities to an extent where the USA 
would have a clear advantage over them if they can help it (as the US would over Russia 
if both agreed to nuclear disarmament). This means that arms control must be careful to 
not create an imbalance in power that was not already present, or else it may well usher in 
a riskier world. It is extremely unlikely that such an agreement would ever be reached as 
the states that the agreement is a detriment towards would reject it outright.  
Arms Control and the Prevention of Nuclear War 
How effective is arms control in preventing nuclear conflict and the use of nuclear 
weapons? Regarding bipolar relations between the USA and the USSR (and later Russia) 
the answer is probably not much. It can also be argued that not too much was done to 
limit the potential destructiveness either. Even the most drastic reductions still left 
enough nuclear weapons to destroy both states. Where arms control may have been more 
influential in doing is in lessening tensions between the superpowers and decreasing the 
chances for any conflict, not just a nuclear conflagration, bur proxy conflicts as well. I 
can find no evidence that the START and SALT treaties increased tension or that they 
84 
 
were the main reason for the lack of nuclear war. Arms control is neither a lone guarantee 
of peace nor detrimental towards it. 
What cannot be disputed is that nuclear war did not occur during the Cold War 
and has not occurred since then. Indeed, the biggest threat today may be North Korea, not 
Russia, when nuclear arms come into play. While there are a host of other reasons why 
there is no war between the USA and Russia, the USA and Soviet Union did come close 
to war during the Cold War, such as during the Cuban Missile Crisis and nuclear false 
alarms in 1983 and 1979. SALT I and the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty were signed in 
1972; this means there were 20 plus years of two nuclear armed superpowers facing off 
against each other with no arms control treaties regarding their most devastating 
weapons, a period which includes the Cuban Missile Crisis. After both SALT treaties 
were signed not only did the superpowers retain the capability to destroy each other, there 
were several other close calls.
112
 Therefore, it is difficult to conclude that arms control 
had a major effect in preventing the Cold War from turning hot. 
Rather than arms control, I believe mutually assured destruction was the primary 
force behind preventing war. There was considerably conflict during the Cold War, many 
of them proxy conflicts, but the USA and USSR never really came to blows. The cost for 
both countries would be too high. It is daunting enough given each state’s conventional 
capabilities, but given nuclear weapons, destruction was guaranteed and any victory 
would be of an extraordinarily pyrrhic sort, with the realistic annihilation of both 
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countries.
113
 In order to prevent such a war, mutual assured destruction must be, at the 
very least perceived as (and this usually means actionable), assured for both sides. The 
nuclear ICBM helped make this a reality, along with the lack of any defenses that could 
effectively prevent nuclear devastation. The nuclear triad specifically aids to support this 
assurance. Enough bombers with nuclear weapons would be likely to get through to their 
targets, but I feel it is not inaccurate to say that the bomber wing is relatively unimportant 
these days as far as nuclear deterrence goes. Nuclear tipped ICBM were and are capable 
of hitting anywhere in the USA and Russia and are difficult to shoot down. It is nigh 
impossible to down the opponents entire arsenal with any missile defenses.
114
 There are 
also methods to prevent the destruction of the ICBM arsenal in a first strike and 
guarantee that they could be used against the enemy. Still the most important leg of the 
nuclear triad is the submarine based nuclear arsenal: these cannot be found and destroyed 
in a reasonable timeframe, and indeed doing so at all is difficult. Nuclear deterrence and 
mutual assured destruction as a means to prevent war relies on technology, the nuclear 
weapons themselves and a means to deliver them that cannot be countered are necessary. 
This also requires a large number of nuclear weapons in ones arsenal. So it might appear 
that arms control would be counterproductive.  
KN Waltz argues, and he is not alone, that more nuclear weapons may be 
better.
115
 This is partly a continuation of the theory of nuclear deterrence via mutual 
assured destruction that prevented the Cold War from turning into World War III (even 
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while it turned hot in many proxy conflicts in the peripheries). It is important to ask how 
numbers impact nuclear deterrence, as there is only a limited quantity of weapons 
required for mutual assured destruction. After all, there being no need to destroy the 
world more than once (as the United States had the capability to do at the Cold War’s 
height).
116
  
Mutual assured destruction, and thus the entire basis for nuclear deterrence, can 
be threatened by protective measure which prevents an enemy’s nuclear weapons from 
striking. Early on in the Cold War this potentially included an initial preemptive strike 
which destroyed the nuclear infrastructure of the enemy state before it could be launched 
against the aggressor state. However this has been taken off the table with secondary 
strike capabilities, particularly the submarine component of the nuclear triad, and system 
like the Russian perimeter system which is supposed to be able to launch a strike if it 
detects mass nuclear strikes. These measures are publicized enough so that the world is 
aware of these indefensible second strike capabilities. This keeps mutual assured 
destruction and its prevention of war alive. Attempts to prevent already launched nuclear 
missiles from striking their targets, such as the American Strategic Defensive Initiative, 
also threaten mutual assured destruction, and thus can increase tensions and the chance of 
nuclear war if one side thinks it may be winnable due to their defenses.
117
 Thus, one 
benefit of nuclear arms control is the maintenance of mutual assured destruction. i 
In a blow to the overall benefits of arms control the current tensions between the 
United States and Russia have little to do with nuclear warheads (and absolutely nothing 
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to do with their chemical weapon stockpiles). On the other hand in the past there was a 
great deal of tension between the USA and the USSR directly related to their nuclear 
arsenals, and it can be argued that the START treaties have helped make this a point of 
relative non-contention, reducing overall tension by eliminating one area on which to 
strain relations. There is some Russia-USA tension surrounding anti-ballistic missile 
systems and chemical weapons in Syria, and arms control could help alleviate these 
issues as well.  
However, arms control is still important in the reduction of tensions. As nuclear 
competition accelerated between the USA and the USSR both perceived heightened 
danger as the number of nuclear weapons increased and the methods of delivery became 
ever more effective. Tensions increased and several of the close calls occurred during the 
ramp up of the Cold War that began in the 1970s and reached its height in the 1980s. The 
stability of the world was increasingly suspect with the SALT II treaty not being ratified 
by the United States senate in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, with the 
Soviets responding in turn.
118
 This runs counter to arms control and history shows that 
when arms control treaties are refused and scrapped tensions worsen. So, at the very 
least, arms control is worthwhile in order to prevent an increase in tension over 
armaments.  
India and Pakistan 
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In discussing the effectiveness of arms control versus military deterrence, both 
nuclear and conventional, in preventing conflict, India and Pakistan present an intriguing 
case study.  Both states possess nuclear weapons, and have signed an agreement over 
nuclear weapons but are not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They have also been 
on the brink of war, and have even fought each other since then. Neither state has used 
nuclear weapons however, and nuclear war would surely cause heavy casualties amongst 
the large population of South Asia.
119
 
The Agreement between India and Pakistan on the Prohibition of Attack against 
Nuclear Installations and Facilities, signed in 1988 and entering into force in 1991, held 
both India and Pakistan to refrain from undertaking or participating in an action aiming to 
destroy or damage nuclear installations or facilities.
120
 The non-nuclear aggression 
agreement does nothing to limit the number of nuclear weapons, delivery mechanisms or 
defense mechanisms, but it does aid the continuation of nuclear deterrence and mutually 
assured destruction to prevent major war. It also requires each country to inform the other 
of the locations of all their nuclear facilities and inform the other country if there is a 
change. There are no compliance measures or verification beyond the annual exchange of 
a list of facilities with the exact location. Indeed, this not an arms control agreement in 
the traditional sense but it does serve deterrence by preventing attacks on facilities that 
develop and produce nuclear weapons, keeping the nuclear threat active and, thus, 
allowing nuclear deterrence to continue. The disclosure of facilities and their locations 
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provides for deterrence, as any attack on these facilities, or large scale attack in general, 
would be met in turn. With all facilities and their exact locations known to the enemy, 
retaliation would be near certain, and likely devastating (particularly as attacks on some 
of these facilities can be harmful to the nearby civilian populations, causing widespread 
casualties). Therefore, the likelihood for attack would be decreased There has, of course, 
been concern that the lists of facilities are incomplete and this is a likely possibility.  
I believe this agreement shows not only the general state of Indian-Pakistani 
nuclear affairs, but also that it is not arms control agreements, but deterrence that has 
been the main force behind preventing an outbreak of nuclear conflict. I do not think the 
agreement helps to prevent lower level conflict, such as artillery duels in Kashmir 
(supported by the fact that this has occurred since the agreements been in place). But it 
may aid in preventing any conflict from spiraling into much bigger, potentially nuclear 
conflict, through adding assurance to mutual assured destruction. 
Hagetry holds that nuclear deterrence has become the norm in South Asia and has 
been fully embraced.
121
 Arms control has been pushed aside, although it could 
conceivably become more important, and it will be unlikely to prevent conflict. However, 
the potential to decrease tension is high, especially given how much tension has been 
produced by the Pakistani- Indian nuclear arms race. But, Hagetry is doubtful of the 
potential for nuclear deterrence, with actual mutual assured destruction consisting of 
second strike capabilities and ballistic missiles. According to him in 1995, India and 
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Pakistan lack these capabilities and the deterrence is more rhetoric than fact.
122
 However 
Hagetry was writing more than 20 years ago and this has since changed, so that today 
both countries are perfectly capable of wreaking mass destruction on the other.
123
 
Deterrence, in whatever form it may take, is important to prevent war, but it does serve to 
increase tensions, lead to arms races, and increase the potential for a war to be 
devastating.  
As mentioned earlier I believe the CWC is not unhelpful and in fact has been 
beneficial to promoting peace in South Asia, but only minimally so, and it has done next 
to nothing to prevent conflict. It only aids matters by providing for an assurance that the 
conflict would not include chemical weapons. To be fair, this is not a small feat and it is 
still a breakthrough. There have been several conflicts between Pakistan and India not 
just since the CWC, but also the development of nuclear weapons and the Non-Nuclear 
Aggression Agreement. The Kargil War occurred in Kashmir from May to July in 1999. 
Since then there have been several standoffs including 2001-2002, 2008, and 2016 and 
border incidents and skirmishes.
124
 These not only present the threat of larger conflict, 
they mean despite, or because of, nuclear deterrence low level conflict seems destined to 
continue, with the potential for nuclear war. At least, thanks to the CWC, the threat of 
chemical warfare has been taken off the table.  
There were concerns that Pakistan and India could engage in nuclear war despite 
the non-nuclear aggression agreement. Part of the problem was the potential lack of 
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mutual assured destruction as tactical nuclear warfare was more likely. Nonetheless 
nuclear war would have been devastating and the threat for larger scale conventional war 
and nuclear war eventually helped persuade Pakistan to withdraw from the occupied 
Kargil heights during the Kashmir War in 1999.
125
 Nuclear deterrence has helped prevent 
any outbreak of not only nuclear conflict but also higher level conventional conflict, 
between India and Pakistan.  
D. Stability-Instability? 
The case of India and Pakistan is often used as an example of the stability-
instability paradox, where an increase in smaller conventional conflict occurring while 
the risk of nuclear war makes full-scale war unlikely.
126
 According to Kapur nuclear 
danger facilitates conventional conflict, and I agree with this assessment, but it only 
facilitates small scale conflict, which can be devastating to local communities, but is not 
as effectual on the country as a whole.
127
 Larger-scale conventional warfare, especially 
anything approaching full scale invasion by either side, would likely be met with nuclear 
weapons. Indeed, Pakistan has stated that it will use nuclear weapons if Pakistani 
conventional forces cannot repel an Indian invasion, a threat that is probable enough to 
make large scale conventional warfare highly unlikely.
128
 But again this is not the case 
for small-scale conflict.  
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The stability-instability paradox may also apply to Russia and the United States. 
There is nowhere near the level of conflict as in the Indo-Pakistani case, a border conflict 
is highly improbable, as is a return to the level of conflict during the Cold War. However 
while war between the USA and Russia is highly improbable, largely due to the nuclear 
threat, proxy conflict is still likely, with some limited cases in Ukraine in Syria. 
Differences between Russia and the USA and India and Pakistan regarding nuclear 
arsenals and tensions, include that Russia and the USA have many more nuclear weapons 
and greater second strike capabilities with mutual assured destruction having been very 
much a part of the USA-Russia relationship for quite a while now. Any conventional 
conflict between the two has strong potential to lead to nuclear war and the stability-
instability paradox functions very differently. Another difference of note is that the USA 
and Russia have an arms control agreement specifically regarding nuclear weapons and 
delivery mechanisms.  
The stability-instability paradox may be lessened by arms control. First off the 
stability-instability paradox showcases, as does the security dilemma, why deterrence 
alone is not well suited to prevent war and decrease the level of conflicts worldwide. 
Deterrence can be useful in preventing war, but it is more positioned towards preventing 
war rather than creating and prolonging peace (positive vs. negative peace). So the 
question emerges: how to eliminate the smaller-scale conflicts caused by nuclear 
deterrence? Disarmament and arms control can be helpful in mitigating war’s 
devastation, by banning certain weapons from use, and preferably from development and 
possession as well. Chemical weapons are a prime example of where disarmament can be 
93 
 
useful. But, whatever the benefits of the CWC, and a world without chemical weapons, it 
will do little to prevent hostilities from occurring in the first place. On the other hand, 
changes in the nuclear situation can have marked effects on conflict. The stability-
instability paradox arises from the risk of nuclear war, so, if this risk is eliminated the 
conventional small-scale conflicts will be less probable, as it could very well escalate to 
full-scale conflict, which, while not as devastating as nuclear war, is still destructive 
enough to make peace far more preferable. Therefore, the risk of total devastation is 
lessened considerably. However, this also means that the probability of a ruinous, albeit 
conventional, war is increased, even if only slightly, and any such war will lead to the 
deaths of many innocent people. 
Power asymmetries are also a concern; something that possession of nuclear 
weapons tends to decrease amongst nuclear powers.
129
 This can lead to more aggression 
and a greater willingness to engage in conflict. Yet, conventional full-scale war is hardly 
a given, in a world without nuclear weapons most countries would still be reluctant to go 
to war. After all, World War II devastated Europe without the aid of nuclear weapons. 
But what nuclear deterrence does accomplish is to prevent tensions, and hostilities that 
arise from tension, whether it be small-scale border conflicts, proxy wars, or other 
anxiety filled events (such as the Cuban missile crises, which, to be fair, would not have 
happened without the existence of nuclear missiles) from boiling over into war. 
Conventional power can do a decent job of conflict prevention, but nuclear capabilities, 
such as those possessed by the USA and Russia, and by most other nuclear weapon 
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possessors nowadays, for second strikes and guaranteed destruction. This is particularly 
so when bolstered by a large number of nuclear weapons, like the arsenals possessed by 
the USA and Russia, assuring mutual assured destruction, and near guaranteeing that any 
tensions or low-level hostilities will not spiral into full-scale war in which there can be no 
victor. Deterrence does function in the core, but it pushes the conflict to the periphery. 
While beneficial for regional peace in the North Atlantic, the nuclear deterrent is 
detrimental to other regions and globally the cause of peace is not advanced.  
Perhaps deterrence coupled with arms control is the best strategy for enhancing 
peace, but it extremely difficult to eliminate conflict through either alone. What can be 
eliminated is direct bilateral conflict between certain states (primarily nuclear-armed 
ones). Arms control can be prevent an arms race which would ratchet up tension. The 
spiral effect of the security dilemma can create conflict on the edges. By solving the 
security dilemma, arms control seeks to correct this dilemma and prevent the spiraling, 
thus, tackling any stability-instability paradoxes. Smaller level conflicts can be mitigated 
by disarmament directed against weapons that are particularly heinous and damaging to 
civilians (such as landmines). But, unfortunately for disarmament, asides from the 
difficulties involved in implementation, the causes of these conflicts, and the conflicts 
themselves, remain unsolved.  
E. Non-State Actors 
Another major gap in arms control, albeit one that is lessened by widely adopted 
and supported arms control agreements with decent arms control regimes, are non-state 
actors. Non-state actors have been a concern for quite some time in regards to arms 
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control and proliferation. In the wake of 9-11 there was substantial concern about 
potential terrorist use of chemical weapons, as they are relatively easy to develop, cause a 
great deal of panic, and are near certain to bring a large amount of attention to the group 
and their purported cause.
130
 The CIA reported, in the early 2000s, that terrorist interest 
in WMDs was growing; confirmed by documents recovered from the Taliban and al-
Qaeda.
131
 More recently ISIL has used chemical weapons, albeit in a very rudimentary 
way with chemical agents filled artillery shells.
132
 Possible insurgent use is also worrying 
(and terrorist and insurgent labels often overlap), and controlling any non-state actor’s 
possession and use of chemical weapons via arms control regimes and treaties is difficult 
at best. The majority of the world’s nations regard such actors as illegitimate and are not 
open to negotiate with them, and, in many cases, neither are the non-state actors. Many of 
these groups, especially those of a terrorist nature, are not constrained by the taboos 
surrounding WMD’s and would be willing to use them if they possessed them.133 The 
cases of ISIL, or of the cult movement Aum Shinrikyo, which perpetrated the 1995 
Tokyo subway sarin attack (which also demonstrates the potential for non-state actors to 
possess such weapons), support this.
134
  
At first glance it may appear that arms control would have nothing to do with 
non-state actors. It is extremely improbable that non-state actors would join the CWC, or 
                                                          
130
 Tu, Anthony. Chemical and Biological Weapons and Terrorism. CRC Press, 2017, 7. 
131
 Bowman, Steve. "Weapons of mass destruction: The terrorist threat." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 2002. 
132
 Schmitt, Eric. “ISIS Used Chemical Arms at Least 52 Times in Syria and Iraq, Report Says” New York 
Time. Nov, 21, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/world/middleeast/isis-chemical-weapons-
syria-iraq-mosul.html 
133
 Brown, Fredric. Chemical warfare: A study in restraints. Routledge, 2017, xxxi. 
134
 Okumura, Tetsu, et al. "Report on 640 victims of the Tokyo subway sarin attack." Annals of emergency 
medicine 28.2 (1996): 129-135. 
96 
 
give up landmine use by acceding to an international agreement. This does not preclude 
the possibility, which I think is real, if not likely, of an arms control agreement being 
reached between a state and a non-state actor (probably an insurgency that may look very 
much like a state). However, arms control regimes can be helpful in dealing with non-
state actors. In the majority of circumstance these actors do not manufacture their own 
weapons, though there are very notable exceptions, such as IEDs and the potential of 
ISIL manufacturing chemical munitions, and rely on others to receive them. Attempts to 
control proliferation of AK-47s may be doomed to failure, but nuclear proliferation 
attempts have been fairly successful, and there have been success surrounding chemical 
weapons as well. Part of this success is predicated on the difficulty in developing such 
weaponry. There are significant obstacles to developing even a basic nuclear weapon and 
even states, such as Iraq have had major struggles when attempting to do so.
135
 Nerve 
agents are not quite as difficult but still require an advanced enough laboratory that only a 
few non-state actors have ever had the capability. Mustard gas is much easier to 
manufacture, but it does require a significant amount of precursor chemicals.
136
 Still, the 
potential exists for WMDS to be acquired by non-state actors and, in that instance, there 
is probably little that an arms control agreement can do to prevent use or lead to 
disarmament.
137
 
Despite the issues surrounding non-state actors, I do not see their potential 
possession of WMD’s being of much increased concern as long as the world keeps 
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vigilant. In order to prevent possession arms control can have some influence and benefit. 
This can be done through international cooperation on anti-proliferation measures and 
military intervention to prevent the production and possession of such weapons. 
International arms regimes that support treaties, such as the OPCW and the CWC, help to 
confer a taboo on use and possession, which holds particularly true for non-state actors. 
These treaties, and the existence of such regimes, even if not embraced by the entire 
world, help to confer a norm that such weapons should not be in the possession of anyone 
save for states, and not even states in cases of disarmament. Thus, non-state actors can 
expect to be condemned. In the case of WMDs there will be more than just 
condemnations, and actions will, in all likelihood, be taken. I base this off of action being 
taken against non-state actors that have used chemical weapons in the past (whether the 
strength of such an action is based on power calculations and realpolitik or on perceptions 
of civilized standards is debatable), and the attempts amongst the members of the nuclear 
club for their club to limit proliferation as much as possible (including preventing Iraq 
and Syria from obtaining the atomic bomb and the current attempts to prevent Iran from 
doing the same thing).
138
 In short the international community, particularly the most 
powerful nations, usually with no dissent between them, will act to prevent acquisitions 
of WMD’s by non-state actors. This may constitute a looser definitions of arms control, 
one not centered on arms control treaties but stemming from non-proliferation 
agreements and enforcement, to military intervention aimed towards affecting 
disarmament. But more formal arms control regimes help to enforce the standards that 
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drive activity preventing WMD proliferation to non-state actors and codify in 
international norms the validity and necessity of such actions.  
Prevention of proliferation surrounding states extends to non-states as well. This 
is effective for nuclear weapons given the difficulty in creating them and the extreme 
vigilance that the major powers keep to prevent proliferation. The CWC monitors the 
production and transfer of precursor chemicals for chemical weapons, allowing for 
international control over their distribution.
139
 This is made simpler as the vast majority 
of the international community accedes to the CWC and seeks a world free of chemical 
weapons, meaning no state is interested in circumventing such controls. In the wake of 
the 9-11 attacks there were also ramped up security measures surrounding the private 
chemical industry. Thus, barring the collapse of a state possessing the proper resources 
and facilities (which has been an occurrence and worry), gaining even the precursor 
chemicals to develop chemical weapons remains difficult for non-state actors, and for 
many states.
140
 However, current chemical weapons possessing states are capable of 
production entirely domestically. Weapons like landmines are also much easier to obtain 
than WMDs.
141
 As such; there are limitations with international non-proliferation 
controls. Given the increase in “new wars” and the growing importance of non-state 
actors, things are likely to change in the future. Non-state actors already have gotten their 
hands on and used chemical weapons. It just happens that a state (Syria) is the primary 
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utilizer of chemical weapons right now. In order to tackle a world in which non-state 
actors play increasing roles in often multi-sided conflicts a new framework may well be 
needed. For now the state-based one can work, but this could all change.  
F. Tensions and Conflicts 
How does disarmament of certain weapons, like what the CWC seeks to do with 
chemical weapons globally, benefit peace? It is impossible to get rid of all weapons and 
even if WMDs are discarded alongside other conventional armaments that have been 
subject to attempted disarmament, such as landmines and cluster bombs, there are still 
plenty of weapons available to cause mass death and devastation, including, and 
especially, to civilians. Arms control and disarmament can be part of an effort to 
eventually achieve a world where there is no war, but there are much more immediate 
ways through which arms control can benefit peace.  
Arms control is advantageous to peace and disarmament is particularly so. 
Preventing arms races, which successful arms control agreements do, inherently improves 
the chances for peace. However, arms control and even disarmament hardly ever prevent 
war and in fact in certain situations, where rising threats require a response that 
necessities an arms buildup, may be dangerous. Yet, while arms control can reduce the 
risk of war it only does so in conjunction with other factors, particularly the geopolitical 
ones that cause wars. If one side wants war arms control is near useless in preventing it. 
But if both sides are antagonistic, but would prefer not to fight, then arms control 
decreases the chance of an escalation to dangerous extremes. 
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Military Intervention  
Military force may be necessary in order to implement arms control and 
disarmament but then questions emerge regarding how this relates to the cause of peace. 
This fits into questions of humanitarian intervention and what this means for peace and 
war. The 1999 NATO military intervention halted mass atrocity in Kosovo.
142
 The threat 
of American airstrikes and military intervention in Syria in 2013 did accelerate 
diplomacy and helped convince Russia to step in and assist in brokering an agreement by 
which the Syrian Arab Republic would dismantle its chemical weapons stockpile and 
accede to the CWC.
143
 Of course this was not quite the success that optimist made it out 
to be at the time and chemical weapons continued to be used afterwards. Relating to the 
chemical weapons taboo, chemical weapons are considered so heinous, so that their use 
induces a responsibility to protect, which often means military intervention justified with 
international law and norms.
144
 However arms control via military intervention or at least 
military intervention in response to use or possession of certain arms deemed abhorrent, 
or the use of military force in an egregious manner, has a checkered history. This heavily 
suggests that ideals behind intervention have less to do with arms control, human rights, 
or humanitarianism than with politics and power. There was a significant, and decisive, 
NATO-led intervention in Libya in response to human rights abuses and attacks on 
civilians and armed intervention against Serbia in response to ethnic cleansing in 
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Kosovo.
145
 There was no issue regarding arms control in either of these cases, although 
there were previous concerns with chemical weapons in Libya that emerged during and 
after the Libyan Revolution. However, when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons 
against Iranian troops during the Iran-Iraq war there was relatively little outcry and no 
threat of action from the West. There was a heavy amount of outcry regarding Syria, 
centered on use of chemical weapons, but although President Obama called for military 
intervention much of the United States’ populace and congress, as well as many other 
Western state’s populaces and parliaments, rejected such an intervention. 
Military intervention when dealing with arms control matters is closely related to 
humanitarian intervention. Military intervention is more closely linked with disarmament 
as the attempt is often to prevent an entire type of weapon from being possessed by a 
certain party. There is often some degree of international cooperation surrounding these 
interventions, with coalitions going in to force disarmament. Military intervention has 
been used to prevent the possession of nuclear weapons in certain cases, with Israel 
bombing Iraqi and Syrian facilities that were directed to that purpose. And there has been 
talk of military intervention, unlikely in my opinion, to prevent Iran from developing 
nuclear weapons. If there were WMD’s to be found, the invasion of Iraq would have 
certainly uncovered most of them and prevented any such weapons from falling in to the 
wrong hands. It is largely the threat of military intervention that functions as enforcement 
for arms control. Thus, for enforcement to have teeth, militarily powerful states must 
back the arms control regimes. 
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Dealing with the outliers 
When working towards global arms control there will be states that lag behind 
and those that appear unlikely to accede to any regime. In the case of the CWC Egypt and 
Israel are currently outliers but if one accedes the other might as well (although this not 
guaranteed). North Korea is one state that remains an obstacle to preventing chemical 
weapons prohibitions from becoming global and threatens to throw a wrench in any 
global arms control agreements. But if an arms control agreement were to be reached 
between The DPRK and other countries it will very likely decrease tensions and the 
chances for war. The DPRK also highlights the role that great powers play in effective 
arms control as well as maintaining peace through deterrence.
146
 Japan and South Korea 
are under United States protection with all the military might of the most powerful state 
on Earth. This is as much a guard against the People’s Republic of China, and formerly 
the USSR, as against the DPRK.   
The DPRK must be dealt with somehow at some point, and there are no good 
options, but for the purposes of global arms control and disarmament, the DPRK can be 
partially ignored. For one the danger of proliferation from the DPRK is not that high 
thanks to anti-proliferation guards. The DPRK could drive an arms race with South Korea 
and Japan, but the United States military, and particularly its nuclear, umbrella helps to 
counter this, allowing both South Korea and Japan to swear off of nuclear and chemical 
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weapons.
147
 Because of this, the American military umbrella has been responsible for 
preventing further exacerbation of tensions in East Asia.
148
 Of course geopolitically it 
must not be ignored and it must be included in global disarmament. But in seeking to 
bring about disarmament of chemical weapons, it is more vital to focus on achieving 
disarmament in the other states that still possess them, than to worry about the DPRK 
given how isolated internationally it is. It is the same with nuclear weapons; although the 
DPRK’s nuclear program, and the continued existence of nuclear missiles, near 
guarantees that the United States will maintain a nuclear stockpile, thus ensuring that 
Russia does as well. But this is hypothetical. As far as preventing nuclear war via arms 
control it is more vital to work out agreements between the USA and Russia, India and 
Pakistan, and to prevent nuclear proliferation. Preventing war with the DPRK relies not 
on arms control, for it is improbable that the DPRK enters into an arms control agreement 
that other powers would trust it would follow, but instead on deterrence and diplomacy.  
Peace and Preventing War 
Arms control and disarmament can lessen the devastation of war by preventing 
certain weapons from being used and thus lessening casualties and destruction. This may 
work well for nuclear weapons, given their destructive power, but for chemical weapons 
and small arms the effects are less clear as if there is a war there are other methods to 
cause death and devastation. Still the hope is that the if the weapons that cause the most 
death and suffering, especially among civilians, are not used, or at least used more 
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sparingly, then the overall death and suffering will decrease as a result. Supportive of this 
reasoning is the fact that certain weapons undergoing attempted arms control and 
disarmament, such as landmines and cluster munitions, tend to still cause death and 
injury to civilians even after fighting has ceased, as well as making certain areas no-go 
zones depriving populations of potential land to live on, farm, otherwise work, or transit 
through.
149
 Where arms control and disarmament work the most towards peace, and a 
more active peace than just the mitigation of the destruction of war, is in the prevention 
of war itself. This ought to be done in conjunction with other matters but if arms control 
solves the security dilemma it also lessens tensions and prevents wars, especially low 
level and proxy conflicts, something that pure military deterrence has been unable to do 
(rather quite the opposite). 
Work to tackle chemical weapons may be a success story, particularly in regards 
to the CWC, and yet there remain major problems. Under the direction of the CWC the 
number of chemical weapons in the world and chemical weapons possessors has 
decreased dramatically. However current events in Syria (2013 through 2018) remind the 
world that chemical weapons are still in existence and can be readily used despite 
international opposition. Syria did accede to the CWC after chemical attacks in 2013 and 
destroyed most of its chemical weapons stockpile.
150
 However afterwards there were 
attacks by the Syrian government using chemical weapons, including toxic gas, likely 
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sarin. The response to one such attack was United States cruise missiles, showcasing that 
even with agreements military force may be necessary to enforce arms control.
 151
   
In the case of chemical weapons I think that arms control is beneficial to the 
world via working to mitigate war but that it does almost nothing to prevent conflict 
itself. While this is true for many arms control agreements, I think it especially pertinent 
for chemical weapons. The uniqueness of chemical weapons and the taboo that surrounds 
them means that their use is unlikely except in certain circumstances, but when they are 
used it is to horrific, if not always decisive, effect. They are completely indiscriminate, 
often following wind patterns, and are more likely than most other weapons to cause 
civilian deaths or can even turnaround on the side that deployed them. Thus chemical 
weapon disarmament can mitigate the effects of war. In no conflict has chemical weapons 
caused anything approaching a majority or plurality of deaths. But they still cause deaths, 
and oftentimes civilian deaths, some of which would be prevented if they were not in 
anyone’s arsenals. There is another reason why chemical disarmament is important, if 
one type of weapon, a weapon of mass destruction none the less, is vanquished from the 
world, not because it has been technologically superseded, but because it is deemed 
against international norms, then this opens the door for other weapons, particularly those 
that are indiscriminate and the potential to cause heavy civilian casualties, to be banned 
and fade from the warzone. 
There is an argument to be made that banning chemical weapons may just 
eliminate people from dying via one horrific form of death to dying via other means, 
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conventional bombs for instance, which tend to be readily available. There is often not an 
area denial weapon that is as effective as chemical weapons (nuclear weapons perhaps 
but there are many other issues with using them) that can clear an area quickly and 
effectively, and also allows your own forces to occupy the area in short order. There is a 
reason the Assad regime continues to use them even after facing consequences and 
condemnation. Chemical weapons also impact life, not infrastructure. Other weapons 
allow for greater targeting and thus fewer civilian deaths. Thus I do believe that the 
prevention of chemical weapons use does save lives. The world ought to follow the creed 
that any amount of lives that can be saved, especially civilian lives, should be. Banning 
chemical weapons does this.  
Even a completely successful CWC would do almost nothing to prevent conflict. 
This is also true for arms control regimes surrounding landmines, cluster munitions, and 
biological weapons, and almost any weapon where the hope for arms control has arisen. 
The exception is nuclear weapons due to their massive destructive capability and their 
position as the preeminent weapon in today’s world. Nuclear weapons and related 
delivery and defense technologies cause tension that no other WMD or conventional 
weapon can (large collections of certain weapons come the closest and aircraft carriers 
are probably the nearest to a single weapon or weapon platform, that can cause 
considerable anxiety approaching, but not on the level of nuclear armaments). There is 
the case of World War II with its general, though not complete, restraint of the combat 
use of chemical weapons. This was a war that happened due to political reasons, 
expansionist and militaristic ideologies, and unsettled questions from World War I. 
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Chemical weapons had nothing to do with the outbreak of World War II. There was an 
arms race beforehand, but though this exacerbated tensions this was not the cause of the 
war, and the lack of an arms race (but with Germany still rearming) would not have 
prevented hostilities. The same is true of the Iran- Iraq War and the Syrian Civil War. 
There is absolutely no reason to expect that the a chemical weapons free world, or one 
free of landmines or cluster munitions for that matter, would prevent conflict. It is still 
worthwhile to pursue the eradication of these weapons, as this may not prevent war but 
will save some lives. 
Arms control does help to stabilize military relationships between adversaries, but 
also amongst those states that are more ambivalent towards each other. In the early 90s 
Betts declares them vestiges of the Cold War as the “Russians are on our side now.”152 A 
noticeable flaw of this argument today is that the Russians are not on our side anymore. 
But the USA and Russia also signed arms control agreements in the early 90s with 
antagonism between them relatively non-existent, and this led to the deepest cuts ever in 
the number of nuclear weapons worldwide. The primary cause for this massive reduction 
of the nuclear threat was the loss in antagonism between the USA and Russia and that 
deterrence could still reasonably be maintained even with mass cuts in both states’ 
nuclear arsenals so there was little risk involved. Allies may need arms control less but it 
still has benefits. Nuclear arms control could help lead to disarmament and at least reduce 
the nuclear threat considerably more. 
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In the case of the USA and the USSR there was no direct conflict between the two 
superpowers nor amongst the USA and Russia and it is highly improbable that there will 
be in the foreseeable future. There are a multitude of factors explaining this, and I will 
not go into all of them, but what I want to ascertain is what role nuclear weapons played 
in this and what role that arms control surrounding nuclear armaments played in 
decreasing the likelihood of war. The United States and the USSR/ Russia may have not 
gone to war but they have supported opposing sides in other proxy conflicts and 
exacerbated these same conflicts. The Cold War was a bloody period and much of it was 
the fault of one or both of the two superpowers. In this way the stability-instability 
paradox certainly existed. Much blood and treasure was thrown in to smaller scale 
conflicts in order to combat the opposing side without direct war between the 
superpowers. I do think this lack of direct war was primarily due to nuclear deterrence. 
But this exacerbated tensions between the superpowers. Arms control can aid in 
mitigating this, although it cannot completely eliminate proxy conflicts.  
Working towards a Global Reduction in Tension 
There is no easy answer as to how arms control can, and should, function to 
prevent proxy conflicts. However I do believe that well designed and well implemented 
arms control may mitigate the risk of these conflicts occurring. For one proxy conflicts 
are driven largely by tensions and increased confrontation. Full-scale war between two 
powers would be too catastrophic so conflict moves elsewhere. Here deterrence works to 
prevent major war between two powers but is not helpful for increasing peace’s reign 
worldwide. In some cases, such as the Cold War, deterrence might be useful, and even 
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beneficial, to peace in the end; however something ought to be done about the mass 
amount of death that is fed by tensions between two powers that cannot fight directly due 
to deterrence. Here arms control can be quite useful and potentially provides a solution, 
or at least a piece of it. Tensions are exacerbated by arms races and deterrence oftentimes 
leads to arms races as espoused by the security dilemma. History provides plenty of 
examples to support this, particularly the build up to World War I and World War II. It is 
important to note that there were other causes of these wars but the arms buildup 
increased tensions and helped to create a situation (particularly during WWI) were it 
would only require a spark to ignite the inferno. This was also the case with the Cold War 
although in this situation the resulting inferno would be so bad, as to be unwinnable, that 
both sides were careful to not let any sparks fly, one of the benefits of nuclear deterrence. 
However there are still issues here, as rather than causing World War III, tensions and 
attempt to gain power and limit the opposing state’s power fed into many proxy wars, to 
continue with my analogy, the sparks flew towards the periphery and ignited or fed 
smaller infernos. The goal is to lessen tension to such a degree that sparks don’t fly. It 
would be folly to say that arms control can reduce tensions to nothing but it will prevent 
tensions from rising and often even decreases them. 
I propose that in much the same way that arms control can solve the security 
dilemma, it can also solve the stability-instability paradox. The instability and conflicts 
that occurs in the lower level and periphery largely arise from geopolitical tensions that 
occur. Arms races and uncertainty help feed these tensions. Arms control seems unable to 
remove the nuclear umbrella under which states might operate, and to lessen it to an 
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extent so that it might weaken the potential for aggressiveness at lower levels. But 
weakening the nuclear umbrella is dangerous as it increases the risk of war at the higher 
level. But arms control can decrease aggressiveness overall by eliminating an arms race 
and putting countries on a known, and guaranteed footing that is equal enough. A 
decrease in tension at the core increases stability all around, including the periphery, 
decreases involvement in proxy wars, and decreases global instability and the chance of 
war worldwide.  
In order to make arms control work, and consequentially benefit peace, there must 
be widespread international agreement and acquiescence, particularly among the more 
powerful nations. Arms control only limits the weapons so there must still be deterrence 
to their use. If the deterrent is powerful enough, and not reliant on the weapon itself, and 
arms control successful enough disarmament may be a possibility. A combination of 
arms control and deterrence can lead to decreased tensions and thus decreased chances 
for war worldwide, solving the security dilemma and stability-instability paradox. For the 
USA and Russia regarding the START treaties and their nuclear arsenal the deterrent is 
their nuclear arsenals. Legitimacy is both a concern and a benefit regarding arms control 
and disarmament. States seek legitimacy and this won’t change, what can change is 
increased legitimization of arms control agreements and of disarmament and the de-
legitimization of the use and possession of certain weapons. Thus legitimization of arms 
control is important for it to truly have an impact. Countries are more likely to join an 
arms control regime and may even want to do so as it can confer certain benefits. And 
there is legitimacy in the perception of striving for peace after all. This sort of legitimacy 
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is particularly important for disarmament. Legitimacy of a disarmament regime also 
means that the international community (led by great powers) will be willing to intervene 
economically, and if necessarily militarily against regimes deemed de-legitimate by 
possession of taboo weapons. This is similar in arms control regimes; with the will to 
intervene against de-legitimate violators of the regime being, necessary to the regime’s 
success, and reliant on the great powers. 
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Chapter Five: Findings and Lessons 
A. Findings 
The question this thesis tackles still looms large today: does arms control and 
disarmament limit aggression and benefit peace? Specifically, this thesis examines 
nuclear arms control and chemical weapons disarmament, and their relationship to peace. 
In seeking an answer, this study has produced three findings relating to the impact of 
arms control and disarmament upon global peace. 
Arms Control and Disarmament are not Detrimental 
Firstly, I find little evidence in the case studies that arms control is at all 
detrimental. There appears to be no case where mutually agreed upon arms control 
produces tension or is a contributing factor to war. I also find that voluntary disarmament, 
with the exception of nuclear disarmament, is never detrimental, though this should be 
qualified. Chemical weapons disarmament that has taken place thus far, and potential 
global disarmament these weapons, seems to have no negative effects. In fact it appears 
to be beneficial, reducing tensions and eliminating hideous forms of killing, and saving at 
least a few lives. The worst that the chemical weapons taboo, and the disarmament 
regime, has done is muddied potential intervention in Syria. But this would have been 
avoided if disarmament had been observed earlier. Disarmament could remove a 
deterrent and invite invasion, Qaddafi gave up Libya’s chemical and nuclear programs 
only to be overthrown and killed, partially due to NATO intervention. But Saddam 
Hussein was strongly suspected of having weapons of mass destruction and he was 
113 
 
overthrown by an invasion largely on that premise. Thus there is the potential for 
disarmament to invite war, but I believe this is unclear, not disarming can be a cause 
belle, save for the case of nuclear weapons. Nuclear arms control agreements have not 
appeared to harm peace in any way. However, there may be potential detriments with the 
case of nuclear disarmament; given the potential importance of mutual assured 
destruction and the nuclear deterrent in preventing war between the USSR and the USA. 
The nuclear deterrent is also a good method to prevent invasion which is what the DPRK 
and Iran are both well aware of. But global nuclear disarmament is extremely unlikely in 
the near future, being a suggestion that exists more on the fringe, leaving its potential 
effects to continued speculation. I want to once again emphasize the unique nature of 
nuclear weapons as the only weapon that would, if it alone disappeared, have a 
significant impact on the state of war, peace, and stability and not for the better. Nuclear 
disarmament does, unlike other sorts of disarmament, indisputably invite war.  
Arms Control and Disarmament can Mitigate Conflict 
Secondly, I find that, theoretically, arms control can indeed lessen the effects of 
war. I observe the same with disarmament, save for the major exception of nuclear 
disarmament, I believe that nuclear disarmament may lead to a more dangerous world 
and one with more conflict (due to the removal of the nuclear deterrent), though this is 
not certain. Perhaps nuclear disarmament may be beneficial, but it is a precarious matter. 
My findings on the matter are inconclusive, but I believe there is enough of a risk and a 
quite a large one at that, attached to nuclear disarmament in the present world. With 
chemical weapons, however, I ascertain that disarmament is beneficial. Chemical 
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weapons cannot be used where they may have otherwise been without disarmament. 
Thus, conflicts can be mitigated. There is also no chance for increased retaliation if 
chemical weapons are not in play. I do not attempt to estimate how many lives could be 
saved if chemical weapon disarmament becomes a global reality (such a calculation 
would be fraught with potential error anyhow and highly speculative). But I am certain 
that it is considerable enough to justify pouring resources into destroying all chemical 
weapons. I am also fairly certain that, by destroying 97% of the world’s chemical 
weapons, the CWC has saved lives.  
Arms Control and Disarmament can Prevent War 
Thirdly, this study finds that arms control and disarmament can benefit peace by 
preventing war, but they cannot do so alone. Disarmament and arms control of non-
nuclear weapons, can theoretically prevent war, or at least decrease the chance of it 
occurring. This occurs due to arms control solving the security dilemma producing a 
downgrade in tensions, and this downgrade leads to lessened chances of inter-state 
hostilities. This includes the case study of chemical weapons. However, I also find that 
chemical weapons disarmament does almost nothing to prevent conflict from occurring 
and there are no examples that I encountered supporting the opposite conclusion. Rather, 
there are many examples to support chemical weapons disarmament, or even chemical 
weapons themselves, having no, or at best, very little, effect on whether a conflict breaks 
out or not. Disarmament may reduce tensions, largely due to the chemical weapons taboo 
and the international community’s stance against them. Tensions increase when a state 
maintains a chemical weapon stockpile, but they become particularly tense if they are 
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used nowadays (it is fair to question how true this was, say during the Iran-Iraq War, and 
it is fair to question how far it goes today). Chemical weapons disarmament is now the 
international norm, which is a welcome development. Thus disarmament decreases 
tensions and thus the likelihood for war.  
This has been supported by events in Syria where the West, particularly the 
United States, threatened to intervene in 2013 against the Assad regime in response to 
chemical attacks. Russia helped to mediate a solution where the Syrian Arab Republic 
would disarm, destroying its entire declared chemical stockpile and as this is part of the 
reason the West did not intervene against Assad (domestic pressure and events in Syria 
themselves cannot be ignored though, but the disarmament allowed a reasonable 
backtrack from threats and tensions). Of course the Syrian Government still possesses 
chemical weapons, and has used them since then. But, when, in 2017, they attacked the 
town of Khan Shaykhun in the deadliest chemical attack since 2013, the United States 
responded with cruise missile strikes against the Syrian government’s Shyrat Air Base. 
Full, actual, disarmament would have meant that the Assad government would not have 
been attacked by the USA in this case. This can also be understood as being supportive of 
disarmament mitigating conflict, as international involvement, based on chemical 
weapons, would never have occurred. At the same time, the Syrian Civil War did not 
break out because of chemical weapons and the foreign intervention has, for the most 
part, predicated on other matters. 
Nuclear arms control was, and is, beneficial for peace between the United States 
and the USSR, and later Russia. In this case, arms control operates alongside nuclear 
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deterrence. This deterrence is maintained via mutual assured destruction, making war 
between the two powers highly improbable. However this allows for increases in 
tensions, which can risk inflaming conflict in the periphery. Nuclear arms control has not 
threatened nuclear deterrence. Rather it has helped to assure mutual assured destruction, 
and thus peace between the USA and USSR/Russia, as neither state will be inclined to be 
overly aggressive. This is also so with India and Pakistan. Assuring mutual assured 
destruction is particularly pertinent in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the New 
START. Tensions have also been decreased, and an arms race been prevented, reductions 
in stockpiles and limits on the quantity of nuclear weapons and delivery mechanisms. 
Nuclear arms control is also beneficial for world peace. It theoretically solves the 
stability-instability paradox, and nuclear umbrellas can extend far. Its effect on peripheral 
conflict is less clear in the real world. There are many other sources of tension beyond 
nuclear weapons, and arms control cannot prevent small conflicts on its own. But nuclear 
arms control can tame the tensions that do arise from nuclear arsenals, and add in a 
measure of stability beyond nuclear powers and their respective umbrellas.  
I mention the unique nature of chemical and nuclear weapons, and this thesis is 
really discussing arms control and disarmament for these two Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. Especially with nuclear weapons an issue of transferability arises due to 
their distinct capabilities. Still, some of the conclusions I reach can be reasonably 
transferred to the other Weapon of Mass Destruction: biological weapons. Biological 
weapons disarmament closely follows chemical weapons disarmament. There is also a 
biological weapons taboo, and the Biological Weapons Convention, which bans 
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biological weapons, has been ratified by most countries in the world. I do believe that 
there are lessons in chemical and nuclear weapons that can transfer to conventional 
weapons particularly landmines and cluster munitions, which are indiscriminate and have 
a tendency to kill civilians, and also have their own treaties that attempt at disarmament. 
Disarmament, or even arms control that lessens the number of certain weapons used in 
hostilities, can thus reduce the number of casualties, particularly of civilians, in war. 
I can say that arms control and disarmament does benefit peace via mitigating war 
and lessening aggression. However I also find that the extent to which they do is limited, 
and they still allow much death and destruction. But it is still worthwhile for it does 
decrease this death and destruction. However, most disarmament regimes, including 
chemical weapons disarmament, do little to prevent conflict from occurring in the first 
place, even if they save some innocent lives. Arms control, on the other hand, does more 
to prevent conflict as it eliminates the tensions of arms races, which can tip over into 
conflict. I do find that nuclear arms control, in particular, helps to prevent conflict and 
decrease tensions, and is one of the most important efforts, given the threat of nuclear 
war.  
B. Future of Arms Control and Disarmament 
The success of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW regime, and 
thus the prevention of the use of chemical weapons, and the chances for their complete 
removal from the world, is debatable but there have been quite a few successes. Indeed, I 
believe that the CWC has been quite successful and is one of the most successful 
disarmament/ arms control treaties. It has eliminated most of the world’s chemical 
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weapons and only a few countries resist. The chances for complete chemical weapons 
disarmament are surprisingly good, and realistic enough that they may even happen in 
our lifetime. It would be foolhardy to hold our breath on it but there is certainly a realistic 
shot. On the other hand there is also the realistic chance that the current outliers from the 
CWC continue to be outliers for a few decades more. On a good note, I do not foresee the 
CWC crumbling in the future. 
I was not able to examine some of the events that occurred in 2018 in depth in the 
paper. Nonetheless they do have significant consequences. The Douma chemical attack 
of April 7, 2018 proved, once again, that chemical weapons do have substantial military 
value in certain conflicts. Any UN response was blocked as Russia and the United States 
continued to attack each other diplomatically and tensions were dramatically increased 
with condemnations and thinly veiled threats of military action between the two powers. 
Tensions were only increased as the USA and its allies considered a military response 
against Syria and then launched strikes against government facilities on April 14, 2018. 
Again, it is not hard to imagine that tensions between the USA and Russia would not be 
so open and so heightened, if Syria did not possess any chemical weapons. The joint 
American, British, and French strikes were directly due to the Douma chemical attack. I 
believe this helps reinforce the norm against chemical weapons. Though it is unlikely to 
dissuade Syria from launching any more chemical attacks it does send a message to the 
international community that these weapons are reprehensible enough to warrant military 
action if they are used. This reinforces the narrative of chemical weapons as illegitimate.  
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There is also reason for optimism about nuclear arms control. The number of 
nuclear weapons has been reduced since the Cold War by an astounding amount. Nuclear 
arms control has also guaranteed that neither Russia nor the USA have a clear advantage 
over the other and assures peace via deterrence and mutual assured destruction. At the 
same time is works to lower tensions, decreasing the chance of proxy conflicts. The 
tensions between the United States and Russia nowadays have little to do with nuclear 
weapons and there is no nuclear arms race anymore. I am optimistic that arms control 
efforts can continue to further reduce the number of weapons that both states have. 
However I do not predict much of a chance of a nuclear free-world anytime in the near 
future. 
Both New START and the CWC can be said to be fairly effective, but not 
completely so. If the goal is the lowering of stockpiles and lessening the chances of use 
there are definite successes. But there also failures if the goal is the complete elimination 
of the use of the corresponding weapons and the absolute destruction of the stockpiles. 
For New START the stockpiles between two countries have been reduced. This has likely 
led to a decrease in chances of nuclear war and a decrease in tensions by rolling back an 
arms race. However, it is more so Mutual Assured Destruction that has prevented any war 
from occurring. It should be stated the Mutual Assured Destruction also led to START 
and treaties like it. 
I do not believe that we can ever make arms control and disarmament alone be 
salve for peace. I do not think we shall ever do away with war as long as humanity still 
exists. The causes can never be addressed by arms control alone. Thus, without a 
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fundamental change in the human relations, arms control and disarmament can never be 
the unqualified bringer of peace. Global peace and successful nuclear disarmament can 
only be achieved alongside each other via the reworking of the state from the inside into 
part of a global utopian vision.  
To conclude, the prospects for arm control and disarmament are both strong yet 
weak. Arms control and disarmament can save a few lives, and perhaps many more. 
Nuclear arms control has the potential to decrease the chances of conflict. Indeed, arms 
control all around does limit one source of tension. But nuclear arms control is 
exceptional. If done properly, nuclear arms control, in concurrence with nuclear 
deterrence, and alongside diplomatic and economic progress, lessens war in the nuclear 
core and the periphery. This can eventually lead to actual nuclear disarmament, thus, 
eliminating the threat of nuclear apocalypse and the potential for resultant human 
extinction. But, in order for peace to truly reign, and for war to become an exceptional 
phenomenon, ushering in a new stage of history, there must be substantial geopolitical 
work independent of arms control. However, arms control can play a role, though not the 
most major role, in this. I do believe that arms control and disarmament can help make 
this a more civilized kinder world and can help build up to a world dominated by peace. 
Arms control and disarmament will, in all likelihood, expand in the near future. Yet, arms 
control must work in conjunction with other measures. Nonetheless, it is an integral part 
of building a more peaceful world.  
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Appendices and Figures 
Figure 1 -A map showing the status of the CWC in 2013. Since then Myanmar and 
Angola have signed and ratified and so has Syria. Israel has signed but not ratified as it is 
today. Thus we can see some slight progress even for the CWC even if Syria is a failure 
as of now.
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 Image created by Milo Ventura using the BlankMap-World6.svg template (in the public domain) 
retrieved from Wikimedia Commons. 
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Figure 2- An up to date map as of April 2018 showing the status of the CWC. South 
Sudan has stated its intent to accede. Syria has acceded but it has still used chemical 
weapons in direct violation of the CWC. There is little reason to believe this map will 
change much in the future, asides from South Sudan. 
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 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY INSTITUTE “Chemical Weapons Convention” Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Project-ILPI. 2016.  
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Figure 3-An infographic of the G-series of nerve agents
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 Compound Interest, “Chemical Warfare & Nerve Agents – Part I: The G Series” Compound Interest. Oct. 
7, 2014. 
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Figure 4 - Estimated nuclear warhead inventory, notice the United States and Russia 
dominate and the large number of retired weapons, as well as stockpiled vs deployed 
weapons
156
 
 
                                                          
156
 Arms Control Association, “2017 Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories” Arms Control 
Association. March, 2018. 
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Figure 5 - A graph of the number of nuclear weapons in the arsenal of the United States 
since 1962 with arms control agreements marked. Note the decline under the START 
agreements and the comparatively smaller decline under new START.
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Figure 6 - A table showing official numbers for the launchers, which include bombers 
and missiles (which may include multiple warheads) more than a year after it entered into 
force. The numbers are derived from a survey from the Federation of American Scientist 
claimed that this was evidence that the US military was in no rush to meet the limits set 
by the treaty and was not invested enough in arms control.
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 Arms Control Association, “U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 1962-2017” Arms Control Association. 
March, 2018. 
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 Table created by Milo Ventura using data from Federation of American Scientists, “US Strategic Nuclear 
Triad Counted under New START Treaty” Federation of American Scientists. Jun. 1, 2014. 
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